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Towards	a	sociology	of	revolutionary	situations.	Reflections	on	the	Arab	
uprisings	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi	and	Olivier	Fillieule			
‘Uprisings	have	a	body	with	which	one	can	engage	in	combat.		
Revolutions,	on	the	other	hand,	have	a	lot	in	common	with	ghosts’.	Metternich	to	Guizot,	October	31st,	1847				 When	we	contemplate	the	apparent	domino-effect	of	upheavals	precipitated	by	the	rapid	and	unexpected	fall	of	Ben	Ali	on	January	14th,	2011,	the	first	image	that	comes	to	mind	is	that	of	1848’s	 ‘Springtime	of	the	Peoples’,	when	a	demonstration	in	the	streets	of	Paris	prompted	 three	 days	 of	 insurrection,	 the	 restoration	 of	 the	 Republic	 and,	 thanks	 to	 the	telegraph,	the	railways	and	the	rotary	press,	over	ten	days	of	uprisings	across	cities	as	distant	as	Berlin,	Munich,	Vienna,	Milan	and	Venice.			 However,	 just	as	when	considering	the	revolutions	of	1848,	we	should	be	wary	of	overly	generalizing	 interpretations	 that	 seek	 to	describe	 the	events	of	2010–2012	as	 the	product	 of	 a	 unified	wave	 of	 insurrections.	 Aside	 from	 the	 trigger	 provided	 by	Ben	Ali’s	downfall,	 the	 trajectory,	 and	 consequently	 the	 shape,	 taken	 by	 the	 Egyptian,	 Moroccan,	Bahraini,	Libyan,	Yemeni,	and	Syrian	uprisings	were	all	very	different.It	is	only	if	we	do	not	understand	their	respective	contexts	or	if	we	are	blinded	by	a	well-meaning	enthusiasm	that	we	may	collectively	refer	to	them	as	the	‘Arab	revolutions’.	It	is	too	soon	to	tell	if	any	of	these	movements	 can	be	 labelled	as	 revolutionary.	 Such	a	question	 can	only	be	answered	with	hindsight,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 results	 produced.	 Therefore,	 this	 is	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 our	investigation.	We	will	instead	focus	on	‘uprisings’	—	a	vague	term	which	has	the	merit	of	not	judging	 what	 particularly	 complex	 processes	 may	 be	 produced	 in	 the	 end.	 We	 are	nonetheless	aware	that	certain	Tunisians,	Egyptians,	Libyans,	Yemenis	and	Syrians	believe	that	 they	are	 living	through	a	revolution	and	are	currently	 fighting	to	make	 it	happen,	 to	encourage	or	protect	 it.	 Likewise,	 although	 the	descriptive	 term	 ‘Arab’	has	many	 implicit	connotations	and	possible	misunderstandings,	we	have	nevertheless	decided	to	use	 it	 for	ease	of	reference.	
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	 In	 the	 fields	 of	 political	 science,	 sociology	 and	 history,	 countless	pages	 have	 been	devoted	to	the	study	of	revolutions.	The	frequency	of	publications	regarding	recent	events	has	been	particularly	high.	What	would	be	the	rationale,	 therefore,	behind	subjecting	our	readers	to	yet	another	of	these	studies?	Two	well-founded	reasons	justify	our	endeavor.	On	the	 one	 hand,	 although	 social	 scientists	 are	 prolix	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	revolutions,	they	are	much	less	loquacious	regarding	revolutionary	situations	specifically,	including	their	characteristics	and	the	processes	that	lead	to	them.	As	we	will	show	in	this	introduction,	recent	publications	have	often	fallen	into	this	trap.	On	the	other	hand,	all	of	the	contributions	made	by	in	this	volume	stem	from	field	surveys	carried	out	at	the	very	heart	of	the	action	and	which	seek	to	understand	how	individual	and	collective	actors	‘caught’	in	revolutionary	 momentum	 perceive	 situations	 and	 adapt	 their	 behavior	 —	 an	 approach	which	is	still	rare	in	the	existing	literature.		 In	 this	 introduction,	we	shall	return	to	our	 justification	 for	 this	 two-fold	approach.	However,	 we	 shall	 begin	 with	 a	 critical,	 albeit	 non-exhaustive,	 review	 of	 the	 existing	literature.	Then	we	shall	 explain	a	 certain	number	of	our	 theoretical	 and	methodological	propositions,	chiefly	relying	upon	empirically	documented	experiments.			
THE	PAUCITY	OF	REVOLUTIONARY	SOCIOLOGY	
	 ‘To	look	for	false	troubles	one	gets	real	misery’.	Daniel	Desbiens,	My	Contemporary	Maxims	
Causality	and	the	Nomological	Drive		 Revolutionary	events	always	strike	their	contemporaries	as	radically	new,	subject	to	rapid	upheavals	and	full	of	uncertainty	regarding	the	future.	Under	such	conditions,	it	is	not	surprising	that	few	people	have	been	able	to	‘face	the	revolution	with	one’s	mind	made	up’1,	like	Marat,	or	to	claim	to	have	predicted	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union.2			 Pierre	 Favre	 has	 astutely	 discussed	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 unpredictability	 of	 the	 social	order.3	Let	us	here	recall	three	of	his	conclusions.	Firstly,	‘with	regard	to	the	future,	we	are																																																									1	Jean-Paul	Marat,	Les	chaînes	de	l'esclavage,	1774,	<http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_	sciences_sociales/index.html>.	2	Randall	 Collins,	 ‘The	 Future	 Decline	 of	 the	 Russian	 Empire’,	 in	Weberian	 Sociological	 Theory,	 New	 York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1986,	p.	186–209.	3	Pierre	Favre,	Comprendre	le	monde	pour	le	changer,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2005.	
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faced	 with	 an	 unfinished,	 on-going	 process,	 about	 which	 we	 can	 naturally	 only	 have	incomplete	knowledge.	Predictions	are	therefore	impossible’.4	Secondly,	‘there	exist	periods	where	a	political	regime	possesses	an	extreme	structural	vulnerability,	and	crumbles	when	confronted	with	a	protest	that	reveals	its	lack	of	consistency’.5	Thirdly,	unpredictability	does	not	mean	that	‘all	predictions	are	impossible	and	will	ultimately	be	disproven.	Predictions,	which	in	reality	we	cannot	do	without,	are	only	conditional,	or	in	other	words	probabilistic’.6		 Among	 researchers	 who	 study	 the	 history	 and	 the	 sociology	 of	 revolutionary	phenomena,	 an	 increasingly	 number	 have	 subscribed	 to	 this	 point	of	 view	 and	 begun	 to	reject	 any	 general	 theory	 of	 revolutions.7 	In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 recall	 the	 two	conferences	 organized	 by	 the	 American	 Sociological	 Association	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	1990s	 to	 better	 understand	why	 the	 events	 of	 1989	were	 so	 surprising.8	Although	 some	articles	published	in	those	two	journal	issues	still	defend	certain	types	of	predictability,	they	are	 overcome	 by	 an	 increasing	 suspicion,	 as	 Charles	 Kurzman	 explains	 in	 his	straightforwardly	titled	work,	The	Unthinkable	Revolution	in	Iran.9	He	criticizes	scholarship’s	never-ending	 quest	 to	 retrospectively	 reconstruct	 the	 causal	 elements	 of	 revolutionary	phenomena	in	order	to	determine	the	factors	behind	their	emergence.	Rejecting	all	causality,	Kurzman	 proposes	 an	 ‘anti-explanation’	 which	 abandons	 all	 attempts	 at	 retrospective	prediction	 and	 instead	 focuses	 on	 the	 lived	 experiences	 contained	 within	 revolutionary	situations.	In	other	words,	even	if	one	cannot	doubt	that	what	really	happens	is	by	its	very	natured	determined,10	one	must	simultaneously	recognize	the	immense	difficulty	involved	in	identifying	this	reality	based	on	a	study	of	its	often	distant	causes.11	Such	issues	hint	at	three																																																									4	P.	Favre,	ibid.,	p.	61.	5	P.	Favre,	ibid.,	p.	171–173;	see	also	p.	195.	6	P.	Favre,	ibid.,	p.	198.	7	In	 addition	 to	 Charles	Tilly’s	 numerous	 publications,	 on	which	we	 shall	 comment	 below,	 some	 examples	include:	Nikki	Keddie,	 ‘Can	Revolutions	Be	Predicted?’,	 in	 Iran	and	the	Muslim	World,	New	York,	New	York	University	Press,	1995,	p.	13–33;	Jeff	Goodwin,	No	Other	Way	Out,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001;	 François	 Chazel,	 ‘La	 place	 de	 la	 mobilisation	 dans	 une	 révolution	 inattendue.	 L’effondrement	 de	l’Allemagne	de	l’Est’,	in	Du	pouvoir	à	la	contestation,	Paris,	LGDJ,	2003,	p.	163–192.	8	The	proceedings	of	the	first	conference	are	published	in	Theory	and	Society,	23(2),	1993.	Those	of	the	second	conference	can	be	found	in	the	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	100(6),	May	1995. 9	Charles	Kurzman,	The	Unthinkable	Revolution	in	Iran,	Harvard,	Harvard	University	Press,	2nd	ed.	2005,	p.	5–6	and	p.	166.	10 	To	 echo	 Pierre	 Favre,	 methodological	 determinism	 thus	 involves	 the	 opposite	 of	 causality:	 P.	 Favre,	
Comprendre	le	monde,	op.	cit.,	p.	54	and	p.	67–79.	11	See	also	Charles	Tilly,	‘To	Explain	Political	Processes’,	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	100(6),	1995,	p.	1594–1610,	here	p.	1601;	Jean-Claude	Passeron,	Le	raisonnement	sociologique,	Paris,	Nathan,	1991,	p.	367.	
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weak	points	 in	 the	existing	research:	an	etiological	 illusion,12	a	nomological	drive	and	the	absence	of	a	theory	of	agency	and	rational	choice.13	 		 The	etiological	illusion	harkens	back	to	one	of	revolutionary	sociology’s	most	serious	dead-ends. 14 	Having	 primarily	 focused	 on	 why	 rebellions	 emerge,	 the	 discipline	 has	generally	stuck	to	finding	distant	and	remote	causes.	These	causes	are	often	attributed	to	the	disruptive	effects	of	social	change	or	the	advent	of	new	opportunities.	The	focus	placed	on	these	 factors	 comes	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 considerations	 on	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 means	implemented	 by	 the	 various	 protagonists	or	 on	 ‘possible	 causal	mediations	 between	 the	suggested	“causes”	and	the	characteristics	of	their	alleged	outcomes’.15	Hence	the	necessity	of	clearly	differentiating,	like	Charles	Tilly	and	Rod	Aya	have	done,	between	revolutionary	intentions,	 outcomes	 and	 situations, 16 	especially	 as	 the	 latter	 tend	 to	 transcend	 the	conditions	 of	 their	 creation	 and	 their	 outcomes	 do	 not	 allow	 us	 to	 retrospectively	comprehend	them.17			 The	 nomological	 drive	 —	 or	 how	 to	 explain	 historical	 sequences	 insofar	 as	 an	explanation	requires	laws	linking	cause	and	effect,	laws	which	history	does	not	possess	—	leads	to	a	two-fold	reductionism	of	the	model.	On	the	one	hand,	explanatory	matrices	are	often	developed	based	on	a	specific	historical	example;	extrapolation	 is	 thus	compulsory.	This	can	be	seen	in	Crane	Brinton’s	model	based	on	the	phases	of	the	French	Revolution,18	or	Theda	Skocpol’s	identification	of	1789,	1917	and	1949	as	genuine	social	revolutions	led	by	 the	 peasantry.19	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 because	general	 theories	 are	 by	 definition	 on	 the	lookout	 for	 recurring	 causal	 patterns,	 they	 significantly	 reduce	 the	 complexity	 of																																																									12	Michel	Dobry,	Sociologie	des	crises	politiques,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	1986.	13 	Rod	 Aya,	 ‘The	 Third	 Man;	 or	 Agency	 in	 History;	 or,	 Rationality	 in	 Revolution’,	History	 and	 Theory,	 40,	December	2001,	p.	143–152.	14	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 this	 illusion	is	 less	widespread	among	historians.	 It	 is	clearly	condemned	by	François	Furet,	Penser	la	Révolution	française,	Paris,	Gallimard,	2009	(1st	ed.:	1978),	p.	40,	39	and	44.	15	Michel	Dobry,	‘Ce	dont	sont	faites	les	logiques	de	situation’,	in	Pierre	Favre,	Olivier	Fillieule,	Fabien	Jobard	(ed.),	L'atelier	du	politiste,	Paris,	La	Découverte,	2007,	p.	119–148,	here	p.	131.	16	Charles	 Tilly	 defines	 the	 revolutionary	 situation	 based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 Trotsky’s	 ‘dual	 power’,	 as	 any	situation	in	which	the	state’s	sovereignty	is	subject	to	multiple,	competing	claims	supported	by	a	significant	portion	of	the	population,	and	where	the	aforementioned	state	power	cannot	not	or	does	not	wish	to	crush	the	oppositional	coalition	(Charles	Tilly,	From	Mobilization	to	Revolution,	Reading,	Addison-Wesley,	1978,	p.	189–222).	17	Rod	Aya,	Rethinking	Revolutions	and	Collective	Violence,	Amsterdam,	Het	Spinhuis,	1990,	p.	20.	18	Crane	Brinton,	The	Anatomy	of	Revolution,	London,	Jonathan	Cape,	1953.	19	Theda	Skocpol,	States	and	Social	Revolutions.	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	France,	Russia,	and	China,	New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1979.	
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phenomena:	at	best	to	stylized	versions	of	themselves,	at	worst	to	a	quest	for	sole	causes.	This	 is	 notably	 true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Robert	 Palmer	 and	 Jacques	Godechot,20	but	 also	more	generally	in	the	field	of	cultural	studies,	where	Patrice	Higonnet’s	work	overemphasizes	the	impact	of	the	Protestant	religion	and	the	role	of	the	‘Anglo-Saxon	consensus’.21		 The	absence	of	a	theory	of	agency	becomes	apparent	when	we	try	to	link	together	micro	and	macro	phenomena.	How	can	we	explain	a	social	phenomenon	when	all	we	have	to	rely	on	is	the	observation	of	individual	actions?	The	existing	literature	answers	this	question	with	three	different	tools:	structural	conditions	(political	opportunity		structures,	the	density	of	horizontal	networks	and	links	to	the	elite,	the	suddenly	imposed	grievances,	etc.),	cultural	idioms	 (cultural	 frames,	 Weltanschauung,	 traditions,	 etc.)	 and	 mobilization	 structures	(leadership,	 material	 and	 organizational	 resources). 22 	In	 this	 tripartite	 configuration,	structures,	culture	and	the	availability	of	resources	dictate	the	course	of	events;	conversely,	these	events	can	also	provoke	changes	in	existing	structures,	cultures	and	resources.	And	yet,	in	this	framework,	‘structure	(with	an	assist	from	culture)	constrains	agency	to	make	the	events	—	by	violence;	and	the	events	constrain	agency	to	change	the	structure	—	again	by	violence.	Agency	 is	 the	Third	Man	between	structure	and	event	who	does	 the	killing	and	coercing.	He	makes	the	action	happen.’23			 In	 reality,	 very	 few	 works	 have	 avoided	 falling	 for	 the	 etiological	 illusion	 and	developing	a	reductionist	model,	and	most	have	likewise	failed	to	adopt	an	explicit	theory	of	agency.24	This	 no	 doubt	 explains	 the	 unfortunate	 fact	 that	 studies	 in	 this	 domain,	 while	relatively	 numerous,	 have	 not	 built	 upon	 the	 findings	 of	 their	 predecessors	 in	 order	 to	globally	advance	research	in	the	field.																																																											20	Robert	Roswell	Palmer,	The	Age	of	the	Democratic	Revolution,	Princeton,	Princeton	University	Press,	1959	and	1964;	Jacques	Godechot,	Les	révolutions	(1770–1799),	Paris,	PUF,	1963.	21	Patrice	Higonnet,	Sisters	Republics.	The	Origins	of	French	and	American	Republicanism,	Cambridge,	Harvard	University	Press,	1988.	22	For	an	illustration	of	this	sort	of	tripartite	explanation,	see	Theda	Skocpol,	Social	Revolutions	in	the	Modern	
World,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994.	23	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	cit.,	p.	144.	24	We	would	nevertheless	 like	to	take	a	moment	to	mention	several	studies	which	do	avoid	these	scholarly	pitfalls.	 For	 example,	Wayne	 Te	 Brake’s	 Shaping	 History.	 Ordinary	 People	 in	 European	 Politics,	 1500–1700,	Berkeley,	University	of	California	Press,	1998),	whose	account	of	the	politicization	processes	of	revolutionary	groups	 and	 the	 constant	 gap	 between	 initial	 intentions	 and	 subsequent	 actions	 in	 situational	 logics	 is	remarkable.		
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Where	everything	is	in	everything,	and	vice-versa		 Hot	off	 the	presses,	recent	studies	on	the	 ‘Arab	uprisings’	are	no	exception	to	this	trend.	The	unpredictable	nature	of	 the	events	 in	question	serves	as	an	almost	obligatory	introduction	 to	 the	 proposed	 explanatory	 frameworks.25	After	 having	 spent	 a	 long	 time	investigating	the	‘causalities	behind	the	lack’	of	democracy,26	it	is	now	time	to	examine	why	the	events	of	2010–2012	have	sounded	the	death-knell	of	the	Arab	world’s	‘exceptionality’27	and	heralded	a	new	threshold	regarding	the	universalization	of	revolutionary	action.28	And	yet,	this	development	also	conversely	means	that	these	same	‘flaws’	and	even	‘anomalies’,29	hitherto	highlighted	as	so	many	obstacles	to	democratization,	ultimately	become	the	causes	of	successful	revolutionary	movements,	thanks	to	the	emergence	of	history.			 It	 is	 true	that	 the	nomological	studies	no	longer	propose	mono-causal	models,	but	instead	 now	 prefer	 so-called	 ‘combinatorial’	 approaches. 30 	But	 such	 multi-faceted	approaches	are	often	little	more	than	the	juxtaposition	of	various	causes,	factors	and	decisive	elements,	 which	 allegedly	 present	 an	 account,	 at	 different	 levels	 and	 moments	 of	observation,	of	revolutionary	intentions,	situations	and	outcomes.31		 We	do	not	have	the	space	here	to	analyze	in	detail	this	rash	of	explanatory	attempts;	the	 reader	 may,	 however,	 refer	 to	 the	 thematic	 bibliography	 at	 the	 end	 of	 this	 volume.	Instead,	we	would	like	to	offer	a	more	free-form	history	and	educational	classification	of	the	main	 theories	 of	 revolution:	 Marxist-leaning	 interpretations,	 structuralist	 paradigms,	theories	of	relative	frustration	and	modernization	and	cultural	and	diffusionist	approaches.	
																																																								25	The	editors	of	the	issue	published	by	the	journal	Mouvements	trace	the	intensity	of	this	surprise	back	to	a	vague	orientalism	which	sees	the	Arab	world	as	fixed	and	unchanging	(Agnès	Deboulet,	Dimitri	Nicolaïdis,	‘Les	hirondelles	font-elles	le	printemps	?’,	Mouvements,	66,	2011,	p.	7–10).	26	Ghassan	Salamé,	‘Sur	la	causalité	d’un	manque	:	pourquoi	le	monde	arabe	n’est-il	donc	pas	démocratique	?,	
Revue	française	de	science	politique,	41(3),	June	1991,	p.	307–341.	27 	Sarah	 Ben	 Néfissa,	 ‘Mobilisations	 et	 révolutions	 dans	 les	 pays	 de	 la	 Méditerranée	 arabe	 à	 l’heure	 de	“l’hybridation”	du	politique	:	Égypte,	Liban,	Maroc,	Tunisie’,	Revue	Tiers	Monde,	special	issue,	2011,	p.	5–24	.	28	For	example,	Hamit	Bozarslan,	 ‘De	quoi	 la	 révolution	est-elle	 le	nom	?	Post-scriptum	pour	poursuivre	 la	réflexion’,	in	Hamit	Bozarslan,	Gilles	Bataillon,	Christophe	Jaffrelot,	Passions	révolutionnaires,	Paris,	Éditions	de	l'EHESS,	2011,	p.	169–182.	29	F.	Gregory	Gause	III,	‘Why	Middle	East	Studies	Missed	the	Arab	Spring?	The	Myth	of	Authoritarian	Stability’,	
Foreign	Affairs,	90(4),	2011,	p.	81–90.	30 	Adam	 Hanieh,	 ‘Egypt’s	 Uprising.	 Not	 Just	 a	 Question	 of	 Transition’,	 The	 Bullet,	 462,	 2011,	<http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/462.php>.	31 	For	 example,	 Jack	 Goldstone,	 ‘Toward	 a	 Fourth	 Generation	 of	 Revolutionary	 Theory’,	 Annual	 Review	 of	
Political	Science,	4,	2001,	p.	139–187.	
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	 First	 and	 foremost,	 events	 in	 the	 region	 have	 given	 new	 life	 to	 interpretations	 of	Marxist	origin	that	erect	the	crisis	of	global	capitalism	as	its	main	explanatory	variable.	In	this	framework,	the	authoritarianism	of	regimes	in	the	Arab	world	is	only	‘the	political	form	of	capitalism’	in	the	region,32	‘crony	capitalism’33	not	being	an	‘aberration	of	the	system’	but	rather	a	normal	 feature	of	 the	processes	of	capitalist	accumulation	throughout	the	world.	From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 Egyptian	 uprising	 marked	 the	 culmination	 of	 thirty	 years	 of	neoliberal	reforms	 imposed	by	 international	 financial	 institutions	and	which	exacerbated	the	country’s	vulnerability	to	the	global	crisis	by	concentrating	the	vast	majority	of	wealth	in	the	hands	of	a	tiny	minority	and	contributing	to	the	growing	class	divide.34	Such	a	reading	can	take	different	forms.	For	the	editors	of	Globalizations’	special	issue,	the	Arab	uprisings	are	a	facet	of	the	‘global	revolution’	against	the	prevailing	liberal	economic	system,	against	the	 exclusions	 and	 contradictions	 produced	 by	 this	 world-system. 35 	In	 this	 light,	 the	uprisings	are	so	many	grass-roots	attempts	to	create	an	alternative	world	‘from	the	bottom	up’.36	From	a	revised	dependency	perspective,	the	events	of	2010–2012	can	be	interpreted	as	 a	 new	 attempt	 for	 countries	 like	 Egypt	 to	 rise	 up	 against	 their	 ‘current	 status	 as	 a	dominated	 region’	 and	 against	 the	 ‘demands	 of	 globalized	 economic	 liberalism’.37	These	approaches	have	the	merit	of	not	focusing	on	the	region’s	‘exceptionality’	and	of	proposing	a	nuanced	reading	of	globalization.	Nevertheless,	as	has	already	been	observed	countless	times	 before,	 such	 paradigms	 suffer	 from	 their	 emphasis	 on	 the	 economic:	 everything	automatically	 stems	 from	 what	 is	 played	 out	 on	 the	 economic	 field,	 including	 relations	between	nations,	the	state	itself,	social	classes,	social	movements,	etc.		 Conversely,	a	number	of	other	studies	subordinate	economic	determination	to	the	primacy	 of	 politics.	 From	 a	 structuralist	 perspective	 like	 that	 adopted	 by	 Skocpol,38	the																																																									32 	Adam	 Hanieh,	 ‘Egypt’s	 Uprising.	 Not	 Just	 a	 Question	 of	 Transition’,	 The	 Bullet,	 462,	 2011,	<http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/462.php>.	33	To	use	Nader	Fergany’s	expression	in	the	Arab	Human	Development	Report	(2002–2005).	34	Lin	Noueihed,	Alex	Warren,	The	Battle	for	the	Arab	Spring.	Revolution,	New	Haven,	Yale	University	Press,	2012,	p.	112.	35	Anna	M.	Agathangelou,	Nevzat	Soguk,	 ‘Rocking	the	Kasbah.	Insurrectional	Politics,	 the	“Arab	Streets”,	and	Global	Revolution	in	the	21st	Century’,	Globalizations,	8(5),	2011,	p.	551–558.	36	Jackie	Smith,	‘Globalizations	Forum	on	Middle	East	Protests.	Commentary’,	Globalizations,	8(5),	2011,	p.	655–659. 37	Samir	Amin,	‘2011	:	le	printemps	arabe	?’,	Mouvements,	67,	2011,	p.	135–156,	here	p.	139.	38	According	to	Theda	Skocpol,	three	elements	play	an	essential	role:	the	international	context,	the	financial	crisis	and	the	division	of	the	elites,	and	peasant	rebellions	(T.	Skocpol,	States	and	Social	Revolutions,	op.	cit.).	
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autonomy	 of	 the	 State	 is	 posited	 as	 a	 basic	 condition;	 its	 determining	 factors,	 crisis	 or	downfall	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 analysis.	 Extending	 this	 approach,	 some	 authors	 have	attempted	to	illuminate	the	contrast	between	the	overthrow	of	the	Tunisian	and	Egyptian	presidents	and	the	resilience	of	other	regimes	in	the	region	(in	particular	Libya	and	Syria).	Such	authors	 identify	 ‘true’	 and	 ‘false’	nation-states,	 ‘moderate’	 and	 inclusive	monarchies	versus	republics,	fragmented	or	homogenous	societies,	oil	profits,	a	past	marked	by	violence,	etc.39	Revolutions	are	thus	seen	to	wash	up	‘regimes	that	were	too	open	and	too	closed,	too	modern	 and	 too	 anachronistic,	 too	 rational	 and	 too	 “insane”,’	40	from	medieval	 garbage.	Placing	 political	 conflict	 at	 the	 center	 of	 everything,	 some	 authors	 have	 examined	 the	structural	causes	of	the	‘Arab	uprisings’	under	the	dual	lens	of	the	global	economic	crisis	and	the	spread	of	the	crisis	within	the	state’s	sphere.			 First	 of	 all,	 in	 this	 line	 of	 thought	 and	 contrary	 to	 third-wave	 democratization	processes,	the	recent	‘Arab	uprisings’	owe	nothing	to	Western	democratic	struggles.	Quite	the	 opposite:	 these	 rebellions	 have	 emerged	 despite	 the	 ‘exceptional’	 treatment	 of	authoritarian	regimes	by	major	world	powers,	obsessed	with	the	‘Islamist	specter’,41	careful	to	 preserve	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 the	 Israeli-Palestinian	 conflict	 and	 eager	 to	maintain	 their	influence	over	oil	resources.	The	tone	used	is	particularly	caustic42	—	some	have	even	gone	so	 far	 as	 to	 point	 out	 the	 means	 used	 by	Westerners	 to	 prevent	 revolutions.43	Decisive	international	 factors	 would	 apparently	 pertain	 to	 the	 economic	 realm,	 in	 such	 an	interpretation.	 Some	 argue	 that	 the	 global	 rise	 in	 food	 and	 energy	 prices	 prompted	 the	emergence	 of	 revolts;	 2007’s	 financial	 crisis	was	 ‘the	 straw	 (or	 the	 bale)	 that	 broke	 the	camel’s	back’.44	The	spread	of	the	crisis	throughout	the	region	was	then	linked	to	a	drop	in	
																																																								39	For	example,	Georges	Corm,	 ‘Première	approche	d’une	contextualisation	des	 révoltes	populaires	arabes’,	
Confluence	Méditerranée,	79,	2011,	p.	93–111.	40	Hamit	Bozarslan,	‘Réflexions	sur	les	configurations	révolutionnaires	tunisienne	et	égyptienne’,	Mouvements,	66,	2011,	p.	11–21,	here	p.	16.	41	Luis	Martinez,	‘Le	printemps	arabe,	une	surprise	pour	l’Europe’,	Projet,	322,	2011,	p.	5–12.	42	See	the	critique	of	the	work	edited	by	Foreign	Affairs,	The	New	Arab	Revolt,	New	York,	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	2011,	by	Raymond	William	Baker,	‘Understanding	Egypt’s	Worldly	Miracles’,	The	Middle	East	Journal,	66(1),	2012,	p.	163–170,	here	p.	165–167.	43	Jeremy	Salt,	‘Containing	the	“Arab	Spring”’,	Interface,	4(1),	2012,	p.	54–66.	44	Jean-François	Daguzan,	‘De	la	crise	économique	à	la	révolution	arabe’,	Maghreb-Machrek,	206,	2011,	p.	9–15.	
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exports,	a	reduction	in	financial	flows	towards	non-oil	based	economies,	a	credit	crunch	and	the	defunding	of	national	development	programs	and	developmental	aid.45		 Secondly,	rather	than	allowing	for	the	social	foundation	of	non	oil-based	regimes	to	be	renewed,	these	reforms	would	allegedly	have	increased	the	number	of	malcontents,46	the	state’s	withdrawal	leading	to	the	breakdown	of	‘social	contracts’	hitherto	considered	as	one	of	 the	 main	 reasons	 for	 authoritarianism’s	 resilience. 47 	The	 rise	 in	 corruption	 and	 the	predation	on	national	economies	by	‘cliques’	made	up	of	individuals	with	close	ties	to	the	heads	of	state	would	likewise	have	frustrated	the	marginalized	elite	as	well	as	the	army,	in	Egypt’s	case.48	Politically	speaking,	‘deliberalization’49	would	have	translated	into	the	spread	of	repression50	beyond	Islamists	alone	and	the	opposition’s	limited	access	to	the	institutional	political	sphere.	In	Egypt,	the	constitutional	amendments	leading	up	to	the	November	and	December	 2010	 elections	—	 a	 key	 step	 in	 preparing	 Gamal	Mubarak’s	 rise	 to	 power	—	provoked	 a	 large	 voting	 boycott;	 the	 number	 of	 opposition	 members	 in	 the	 parliament	dropped	below	2005	levels.	As	access	to	institutional	political	life	was	blocked,	taking	to	the	streets	became	the	only	viable	alternative.51		 Such	 interpretations	 are	 useful	 for	 reintroducing	 the	 state	 into	 the	 equation	 and	focusing	 on	 relations	 between	 social	 groups,	 between	 these	 groups	 and	 the	 state	 and	between	 different	 states.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 same	 criticisms	 as	structuralist	 interpretations:	 that	 is	 to	say,	 the	marginalization	of	cultural	and	 ideological	dimensions,	 the	 lack	of	 attention	paid	 to	 the	uprisings	 themselves	and	more	generally,	 a	certain	negligence	with	regard	to	process.		 In	 another	 realm	 of	 scholarship,	 analyzing	 the	 recent	 wave	 of	 protests	 has	 led	 a	number	of	authors	to	employ	the	mechanisms	of	relative	frustration.	As	the	symbol	of	the	
																																																								45	For	example,	El	Mouhoub	Mouhoud,	‘Economie	politique	des	révolutions	arabes	:	analyse	et	perspectives’,	
Maghreb-Machrek,	210,	2011–2012,	p.	35–47.	46	F.	G.	Gause	III,	‘Why	Middle	East	Studies	Missed	the	Arab	Spring?’,	art.	cit.,	p.	86	47	For	example,	Béatrice	Hibou,	‘Économie	politique	et	morale	d’un	mouvement	social’,	Politique	africaine,	121,	2011,	p.	5–22.	48	For	example,	Vincent	Geisser,	Abir	Krefa,	 ‘L’uniforme	ne	fait	plus	le	régime,	 les	militaires	arabes	face	aux	“révolutions”’,	Revue	internationale	et	stratégique,	83,	2011,	p.	93–102.	49	Eberhard	Kienle,	A	Grand	Delusion.	Democracy	and	Economic	Reform	in	Egypt,	London,	Tauris,	2000.	50	George	Joffé,	‘The	Arab	Spring	in	North	Africa.	Origins	and	Prospects’,	The	Journal	of	North	African	Studies,	16(4),	2011,	p.	507–532.	51	L.	Noueihed,	A.	Warren,	The	Battle,	op.	cit.,	p.	106.	
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Tunisian	 uprising,	 Mohamed	 Bouazizi	 was	 first	 portrayed	 as	 an	 ‘unemployed	 college	graduate’.	This	piece	of	information	—	no	matter	how	false	it	was	—	prompted	a	whole	slew	of	interpretations	that	emphasized	the	loss	of	social	status	and	feelings	of	humiliation	and	injustice.52	The	media	abundantly	made	reference	to	such	interpretations,	interactive	graphs	and	 charts	 in	 hand:	 The	 Economist	 Online	 even	 published	 ‘The	 Shoe-Thrower’s	 Index’,53	developed	on	the	basis	of	a	group	of	statistical	indicators.		 As	we	already	remarked	ten	years	ago,	frustration	approaches	‘take	several	different	forms:	an	economic	crisis,	“alienation”	caused	by	the	rapid	transformations	experienced	by	Maghrebi	and	Middle	Eastern	societies,	be	it	rural	exoduses	and	accelerated	urbanization	or	“demographic	ruptures”	provoked	by	the	massive	influx	of	post-independence	generations	on	 the	 job	 market,	 the	 housing	 market,	 etc.;	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 “imitated	 State”	 or	 the	“imported	State”	[...];	a	rise	in	feelings	of	being	excluded	by	globalization’.54	Likewise,	since	the	1980s,	Arab	youth	has	been	observed	‘through	the	prism	of	the	crisis’	and	unemployment	among	college	graduates	has	been	touted	as	the	main	argument	used	to	explain	a	whole	host	of	phenomena:	population	pressure,55	difficulties	with	workplace	integration	and	feelings	of	social	degradation,	as	well	as	housing,	marriage,	economic	and	political	crises.56		 These	interpretations	single	out	empirically	observable	and	quantifiable	phenomena.	However,	they	also	elicit	the	same	objections	as	interpretations	that	rely	on	the	theory	of	relative	frustration:	the	‘volcanic’	nature	of	the	model,	the	predominance	of	a	psychological,	rather	 than	 sociological,	 point	 of	 view,	 a	 vague	 description	 of	 the	 connection	 between	objective	 conditions	 and	 tautologically-deduced	 perceptions,	 a	 weak	 justification	 of	 the	
																																																								52	For	a	critique	of	these	types	of	interpretations,	please	see	in	particular	Amin	Allal,	Youssef	El-Chazli,	‘Figures	du	déclassement	et	passage	au	politique	dans	les	situations	révolutionnaires	égyptienne	et	tunisienne’,	in	Ivan	Sainsaulieu,	Muriel	Surdez	(ed.),	Sens	politiques	du	travail,	Paris,	Armand	Colin,	2012,	p.	321–336.	53 	‘Arab	 Unrest	 Index.	 The	 Shoe-Thrower’s	 Index’,	 The	 Economist	 Online,	 February	 9,	 2011,	<http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/02/daily_chart_arab_unrest_index>.	54	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	Olivier	Fillieule,	‘Appel	d’air(e)’,	in	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	Olivier	Fillieule	(ed.),	
Résistances	et	protestations	dans	les	sociétés	musulmanes,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2003,	p.	17–42,	here	p.	34.	55 	Emmanuel	 Todd,	 Allah	 n’y	 est	 pour	 rien	 !	 Sur	 les	 révolutions	 arabes	 et	 quelques	 autres,	 Loubiana,	Arretsurimages.net,	 2011;	 Emmanuel	 Todd,	 Youssef	Courbage,	Le	 rendez-vous	 des	 civilisations,	Paris,	 Seuil,	2007.	56 	Mounia	 Bennani-Chraïbi,	 Iman	 Farag,	 ‘Constitution	 de	 la	 jeunesse	 dans	 les	 sociétés	 arabes	 :	 figures,	catégories	et	analyseurs’,	in	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	Iman	Farag	(ed.),	Jeunesses	des	sociétés	arabes,	Paris,	Aux	lieux	d’être,	2007,	p.	11–47,	here	p.	18ff.	
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transition	from	relative	deprivation	to	mobilization,	etc.57	Not	to	mention	the	fact	that	this	notion	 has	 traditionally	 been	 quite	 popular	 in	 studies	 of	 Maghrebi	 and	 Middle	 Eastern	societies,	 whether	 the	 latter	 have	 sought	 to	 explain	 Islamist	 movements,	 urban	 riots	 or	suicide	attacks.		 As	the	central	player	in	the	‘Arab	uprisings’,	Arab	youth	is	no	longer	solely	portrayed	by	the	figure	of	the	unemployed	college	graduate,	but	also	by	the	more	glamorous	image	of	the	young,	educated	man	or	woman	who	loves	modernity,	democracy	and	digital	technology	—	in	part	because	this	image	is	much	more	attractive	to	Western	commentators.	Thanks	to	this	iconic	figure,	the	paradigm	of	modernization	has	resurfaced	in	new	garb.58	According	to	such	interpretations,	because	it	is	progressive	and	because	it	is	open	to	Western	democratic	culture,	 notably	 via	 its	 cultural	 products	 and	 its	 access	 to	 more	 and	 more	 information,	controlled	with	increasing	difficulty,	the	‘globalized’	youth	of	Arab	societies	would	inevitably	produce	a	democratic	awakening.59	This	refrain	 is	not	new.	 If	we	exclude	the	parenthesis	marking	the	‘end	of	the	great	developmentalist	narrative’,	when	these	same	youths	become	‘Islamists’,	‘fanatics’,	‘terrorists’,	we	are	not	far	from	the	aftermath	of	national	independence,	when	‘the	youth’	was	considered	to	be	‘the	motor	of	social	and	political	change,	embodying	the	values	of	modernity’.60	The	only	new	elements	present	in	2011’s	rhetoric	are	a	handful	of	 adjectives:	 this	youth	 is	 ‘connected’	 and	 ‘globalized’.	Thanks	 to	 its	 creativity,	 the	 ‘Arab	public’	 has	 now	 been	 put	 forth	 as	 an	 example	 for	 all	 disenfranchised	 peoples, 61	demonstrating	that	‘political	innovation	can	emerge	from	the	outskirts	of	society’.62	
																																																								57	Philippe	Corcuff,	‘Frustrations	relatives’,	and	Isabelle	Sommier,	‘Privation	relative’,	in	Olivier	Fillieule,	Lilian	Mathieu,	Cécile	Péchu	(ed.),	Dictionnaire	des	mouvements	sociaux,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2009,	p.	242–248	and	p.	441–448	respectively.	58	For	Samuel	Huntington,	revolutions	are	a	component	of	modernization.	They	are	a	response	to	an	overly	rapid	and	poorly	controlled	process	of	modernization,	 for	example	when	there	are	important	discrepancies	between	sectors’	different	rates	of	modernization	and,	more	specifically,	when	the	development	of	political	institutions	lags	behind	social	and	economic	change	(Samuel	Huntington,	Political	Order	in	Changing	Societies,	New	Haven,	Yale	University	Press,	1968).	59	See,	 for	example,	the	enthusiasm	displayed	for	the	 ‘Wired,	Educated	and	Shrewd,	Young	Egyptians	[who]	Guide	Revolt’	title	from	The	New	York	Times,	February	10,	2011,	p.	1.	See	also	Farhad	Khosrokhavar,	The	New	
Arab	Revolutions	that	Shook	the	World,	Boulder,	Paradigm	Publishers,	2012.	60	F.	Khosrokhavar,	ibid.,	p.	17. 61	Georges	Corm,	‘Quand	la	rue	arabe	sert	de	modèle	au	Nord’,	Le	Monde,	February	11,	2011.	62	Yves	Gonzalez-Quijano,	‘Les	“origines	culturelles	numériques”	des	révolutions	arabes’,	March	23,	2011,	p.	4,	<http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/archive/2011/mars/dossier/art_ygq.pdf>. 
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	 In	these	attempts	to	decipher	recent	events	in	the	Arab	world,	technology	has	been	presented	as	 the	active	revolutionary	agent.	Here	again,	 the	 idea	 is	not	new.	Theorists	of	modernization	 already	 granted	 a	 central	 role	 to	 technology	 with	 regard	 to	 the	implementation	 of	 social	 change.	 But	 with	 the	 development	 of	 new	 information	 and	communications	 technologies	 (NICTs),	 the	 frequency	 of	 publications	 on	 the	 subject	 has	continued	to	rise;	this	fervor	is	moreover	periodically	rekindled	by	specific	events,	such	as	the	 Zapatista	 insurrection	 in	 1994,	 various	 anti-globalization	 movements,	 the	 coalition	against	the	Iraq	war	in	2003	and	of	course,	the	Iranian	and	Moldavian	rebellions	of	2009,	hastily	termed	‘Twitter	revolutions’.63	Thanks	to	the	media	hype	surrounding	2011’s	calls	for	mobilization	on	Facebook,	the	expressions	‘Facebook	Revolution’,	‘Revolution	2.0’	and,	in	Tunisia’s	 case,	 ‘Wikileaks	 Revolution’	 gained	 traction.	 In	 the	 minds	 of	 ‘cyberphiles’	 and	‘cyber-utopians’,	the	new	information	and	communications	technologies	would	democratize	information	production	and	allow	for	an	almost	instantaneous	diffusion	of	texts,	images	and	videos	 within	 national	 spheres	 and	 beyond,	 thus	 sidestepping	 the	 monopoly	 held	 by	traditional	media	outlets.	Moreover,	these	technological	developments	would	allow	for	most	of	the	problems	linked	to	mobilization	in	repressive	environments	to	be	solved:	‘This	new	technology	represents,	if	not	the	end,	at	least	the	death	throes	of	Lenin’s	What	is	to	be	done?.	When	a	simple	click	allows	individuals	to	get	in	touch	and	protests	to	be	orchestrated,	the	role	 of	 organization	 disappears’. 64 	As	 for	 arguments	 against	 ‘cyber-utopianism’,	 they	downplay	 the	 role	 played	 by	NICTs	with	 regard	 to	 instigating	 and	 organizing	 rebellions,	demystify	the	power	of	the	Internet,65	remind	us	that	the	public	virtual	counter-space	can	also	be	‘yet	another	ruse	of	the	Orwellian	regime’66	and	finally,	that	technology	does	not	a	revolution	make.67																																																									63 	References	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 thematic	 bibliography	 at	 the	 end	 of	 this	 volume.	 For	 a	 comprehensive	approach	to	the	relations	between	the	media	and	mobilizations,	see	Érik	Neveu,	‘Médias,	mouvements	sociaux,	espaces	publics’,	Réseaux,	17(98),	1999,	p.	17–86;	and	more	specifically	concerning	NICTs:	Dominique	Cardon,	Fabien	Granjon,	Médiactivistes,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2010.	64	Bertrand	Badie,	‘Printemps	arabe	:	un	commencement’,	Études,	415(7–8),	2011,	p.	7–18,	here	p.	15.	65	Evgeny	Morozov,	The	Net	Delusion.	The	Dark	Side	of	Internet	Freedom,	New	York,	Public	Affairs,	2010.	66	Roshanak	Shaery-Eisenlohr	‘From	Subjects	to	Citizens?	Civil	Society	and	the	Internet	in	Syria’,	Middle	East	
Critique,	20(2),	2011,	p.	127–138,	here	p.	137.	On	the	arguments	presented	by	‘cyberphiles’	and	‘cyberskeptics’,	see,	for	example,	James	L.	Gelvin,	The	Arab	Uprisings.	What	Everyone	Needs	to	Know,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	2012,	p.	50ff.	67	For	example,	Sahar	Khamis,	Paul	B.	Gold,	Katherine	Vaughn,	 ‘Beyond	Egypt’s	 “Facebook	Revolution”	and	Syria’s	“YouTube	Uprising”’,	Arab	Media	&	Society,	15,	2012,	
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	 The	double	emphasis	placed	by	scholarly	and	media	discourse	on	‘globalized’	youth	and	the	idea	of	‘Revolution	2.0’	revived	a	certain	condemnation	of	the	concept	of	unilinear,	teleological	change	and	progress;	it	also	renewed	the	debate	surrounding	neo-Orientalism.	Consequently,	 for	 Rabab	 El-Mahdi,	 the	 very	 fact	 of	 describing	 uprisings	 as	 ‘young’	 and	‘nonviolent’	and	of	establishing	social	media	as	the	‘champion’	of	rebellion	betrays	a	‘binary’	Orientalist	reading	which	seeks	to	confirm	the	West’s	supremacy	by	contrasting	tradition	—	associated	 with	 obscurantism,	 violence	 and	 all	 sorts	 of	 obstacles	 to	 progress	 —	 with	‘imported’,	liberating	modernity.68		 The	episteme	of	modernity	can	also	partly	be	found	in	interpretations	that	focus	on	cultural	factors	‘which	also	allow	for	a	radical	break	to	be	envisioned	and	desired’,69	or	which	deal	with	changes	in	 the	 forms	of	obedience	and	the	cultures	of	resistance	that	engender	rebellion.	 Comparing	 the	 ‘cultural	 origins’	 of	 the	 French	 and	 English	 Revolutions,	 Roger	Chartier	 analyzes	 five	 different	 factors	 previously	 identified	 by	 Lawrence	 Stone70 :	 the	transformation	of	attitudes	towards	religion;	the	importance	of	legal	references;	a	‘cultural	ideal’	marked	by	the	exclusion	of	the	court	and	the	capital;	a	state	of	mind	characterized	by	the	 gradual	 erosion	 of	 the	 family,	 the	 state	 and	 the	 church’s	 authority;	 and	 intellectual	frustration	 tied	 to	 ‘the	 excessive	 development	 of	 education’.	 Recent	 studies	 have	 often	implicitly	relied	upon	this	five-part	analysis.		 The	epithets	used	in	such	readings	immediately	reveal	the	capital	importance	placed	on	values	and	ideas:	revolutions	are	characterized	as	‘modern’,	‘democratic’,	‘citizen’,	‘post-modern’	 or	 ‘post-Islamist’,	 for	 example.71 	In	 a	 radical	 departure	 from	 previous	 political	generations,	which	were	nationalist	and	Islamist,	the	current	protestors	would	thus	be	the	standard-bearers	of	a	cultural	and	intellectual	revolution.72	These	new	men	and	women	have	allegedly	 forged	 ‘a	 new	 relationship	 to	 the	 self,	 a	 new	 relationship	with	others,	with	 the																																																									<http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=791>.	68 	Rabab	 El-Mahdi,	 ‘Orientalising	 the	 Egyptian	 Uprising’,	 Jadaliyya,	 April	 2011,	<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1214/orientalising-the-egyptian-uprising>.	 See	 also	 Greg	 Burris,	‘Lawrence	 of	 E-rabia.	 Facebook	 and	 the	 New	 Arab	 Revolt’,	 Jadaliyya,	 October	 2011,	<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2884/lawrence-ofe-rabia_facebook-and-the-new-arab-revo>.	69	Roger	Chartier,	Les	origines	culturelles	de	la	Révolution	française,	Paris,	Seuil,	1990,	p.	247.	70	Lawrence	Stone,	The	Causes	of	the	English	Revolution,	1529–1642,	London,	Ark	Paperbacks,	1972.	71	Olivier	Roy,	‘Des	révolutions	post-islamistes’,	Le	Monde,	February	12,	2011.	72	Jeffrey	 C.	 Alexander,	Performative	 Revolution	 in	 Egypt.	 An	 Essay	 in	 Cultural	 Power,	 London,	 Bloomsbury	Academic,	2011,	p.	18.	
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world	 and	 in	 particular	with	 the	West’,	73	as	well	 as	with	 political,	 religious	 and	 familial	authorities.74	Now	is	the	time	for	the	individual	to	triumph	over	denominational,	sectarian,	or	 tribal	 allegiances.	 This	 ‘democratization	 of	 minds’ 75 	allegedly	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 the	elaboration	of	 an	Arab	public	 sphere,	 in	 large	part	 thanks	 to	Al	 Jazeera,	 the	 latter	having	helped	 to	 mold	 ‘a	 new	 Arab	 public’, 76 	to	 circumvent	 official	 demands	 and	 to	 promote	unprecedented	media	pluralism	granting	space	to	‘opinions...	and	other	opinions’	(ar-ra’y	wa	
ar-ra’y	al-akhar).77	In	the	same	vein,	some	studies	have	emphasized	the	role	played	by	the	off-stage	discourse	of	subordinate	groups78	—	rumors,	anecdotes	—	and	by	a	multitude	of	cultural	objects	—	video	clips,	films,	TV	series,	essays,	novels,79	plays,	blogs,	etc.	—	in	the	dissemination	of	liberal	values	and	the	delegitimization	of	existing	authorities	by	means	of	the	critique	of	authoritarianism	and	corruption.	The	‘leader’s	disgrace’	would	thus	anticipate	his	downfall.80			 Readings	like	these	highlight	the	impact	of	ideas	and	values,	otherwise	marginalized	by	a	large	number	of	studies.	We	must	still,	however,	‘update	their	dynamics	and	be	careful	not	to	overlook	their	role	at	the	heart	of	the	action,	that	is	to	say,	their	 ‘effectiveness’.	[...]	‘Rhetorical	logic’	is	not	the	same	thing	as	‘a	reason	for	acting’.81		 We	shall	conclude	this	rapid	overview	of	the	existing	literature	on	‘Arab	uprisings’	by	invoking	a	leitmotiv	in	tribute	to	Dwight	Eisenhower.	The	fall	of	Hosni	Mubarak	four	weeks	after	 that	 of	 Zine	 El-Abidine	 Ben	 Ali	 instigated	 a	 flood	 of	 colorful	 expressions,	 such	 as	‘domino	effect’,	‘contagion’,	‘tsunami’,	‘breaking	wave’,	‘snowballing’,	etc.	Regardless	of	the	
																																																								73	F.	Khosrokhavar,	The	New	Arab	Revolutions,	op.	cit.,	p.	10.	74	Y.	Gonzalez-Quijano,	‘Les	origines	culturelles’,	art.	cit.,	p.	10.	On	the	subject	of	the	democratization	of	religious	matters,	see	Dale	F.	Eickelman,	James	P.	Piscatori,	Muslim	Politics,	Princeton,	Princeton	University	Press,	1996.	75	Mohamed	Nanabhay,	Roxane	Farmanfarmaian,	‘From	Spectacle	to	Spectacular.	How	Physical	Space,	Social	Media	and	Mainstream	Broadcast	Amplified	the	Public	Sphere	in	Egypt’s	“Revolution”’,	The	Journal	of	North	
African	Studies,	16(4),	2011,	p.	573–603.	76	Miles	Hugh,	Al	Jazeera,	London,	Abacus,	2005.	77	Claire-Gabrielle	Talon,	 ‘Al	 Jazeera,	un	objet	médiatique	original.	Une	critique	des	normes	 journalistiques	occidentales’,	Les	Temps	modernes,	664,	2011,	p.	55–62,	here	p.	59.	See	also	Yves	Gonzalez-Quijano,	Tourya	Guaaybess,	Les	Arabes	parlent	aux	Arabes,	Arles,	Sindbad/Actes	Sud,	2009;	Marc	Lynch,	Voices	of	the	New	Arab	
Public,	New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006. 78	James	C.	Scott,	Domination	and	the	Arts	of	Resistance,	New	Haven,	Yale	University	Press,	1990.	79	Alaa	El	Aswany,	L’immeuble	Yacoubian,	Arles,	Actes	Sud,	2006.	80	On	this	subject,	see	Michel	Camau’s	groundbreaking	article,	‘La	disgrâce	du	chef.	Mobilisations	populaires	arabes	et	crise	du	leadership’,	Mouvements,	66,	2011,	p.	22–29.	81	François	Chazel,	‘Les	ruptures	révolutionnaires.	Problèmes	de	définition’,	in	Madeleine	Grawitz,	Jean	Leca	(ed.),	Traité	de	science	politique,	Paris,	PUF,	vol.	2,	1985,	p.	635–646,	here	p.	652.	
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causal	 links	 evoked,	 these	 expressions	 always	 referred	 to	 the	 notions	 of	 diffusion	 and	dissemination.	 Here	 we	 can	 make	 a	 specific	 point	 that	 departs	 from	 the	 usual	 debates	surrounding	this	question.	The	uniting	influence	of	 ‘Arab’	or	‘Islamic’	causes	has	often	led	scholars	to	posit	 the	existence	of	 ‘an	“Arab	or	Muslim	public”,	an	“Arab	or	Muslim	voice”,	ready	to	mobilize	and	rise	up	as	an	uniform	entity,	with	a	single	shared	motivation,	mode	of	action,	 and	 understanding	 of	 the	 stakes’. 82 	While	 criticizing	 the	 illusory	 homogeneity	conveyed	by	the	use	of	the	adjective	‘Arab’	to	describe	the	‘uprisings’,	these	scholars	have	nevertheless	 argued	 that	 an	 ‘imagined	 Arab	 community’ 83 	has	 been	 fashioned.	 This	community	has	purportedly	been	constructed	thanks	to	a	dialogue	encouraged	by	a	shared	language	and	civilization,	as	well	as	similar	historical	experiences;	it	has	been	solidified	by	pilgrimages,	 travel,	 labor	migration	 and	 the	media.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 Al	 Jazeera’s	satellite	 channel	 is	 the	 vehicle	 for	 a	 new	 grassroots	 pan-Arabism	 constructed	 by	individuals,84	where	Gamal	Abdel	Nasser’s	radio	station	‘Voice	of	the	Arabs’,	created	in	1953,	had	been	the	symbol	of	Arab	nationalism	supported	by	Arab	states.			 If,	 until	 now,	 the	 transnational	 character	 of	 revolts	 throughout	 the	 region	 has	primarily	been	understood	through	the	lens	of	Al-Qaeda	and	Islamist	movements,85	today	emphasis	 is	 instead	 placed	 on	 the	 role	 of	 transnational	 networks	 and	 that	 of	 Western	foundations	and	organizations	with	regard	to	the	dissemination	of	democratic	ideas.	If	we	accept	this	vision,	we	do	not	have	far	to	go	before	erecting	the	American	scholar	and	activist	Gene	Sharp	as	the	instigator	of	the	Arab	revolts	—	a	step	that	many	have	already	taken.86	According	 to	 Sharp’s	 followers,	 Egyptians	 and	 Tunisians	were	 introduced	 to	 non-violent	protests	 thanks	 to	 his	 famous	 manual,	 From	 Dictatorship	 to	 Democracy,	 as	 well	 as	 any	training	they	may	have	received	at	the	Centre	for	Applied	Non	Violent	Actions	and	Strategies	(CANVAS)	founded	in	Belgrade	by	the	Otpor!	movement,	or	at	Qatar’s	Academy	for	Change.87																																																										82	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘Les	conflits	du	Moyen-Orient	au	miroir	des	communautés	imaginées	:	la	rue	arabe	existe-t-elle	?	Cas	du	Maroc’,	A	Contrario,	5(2),	2008,	p.	147–156.	83	Benedict	Anderson,	 Imagined	 Communities.	 Reflections	 on	 the	Origin	 and	 Spread	 of	Nationalism,	 London,	Verso,	1991.	84	For	example,	Bichara	Khader,	‘Le	“printemps	arabe”	:	un	premier	bilan’,	Alternatives	Sud,	19,	2012,	p.	7–39.	85	For	example,	Olivier	Roy,	Globalized	Islam.	The	Search	for	a	New	Ummah,	New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004.	86	For	example,	David	D.	Kirkpatrick,	David	E.	Sanger,	‘A	Tunisian-Egyptian	Link	That	Shook	Arab	History’,	The	
New	York	Times,	February	13,	2011.	87	The	communities	directly	affected	did	not	wait	longer	before	retaliating	with	a	humorous	counter-offensive	
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	 This	does	not	mean	that	we	reject	out	of	hand	all	diffusionist	interpretations.	Quite	on	the	contrary,	we	would	like	to	revive	the	debate	with	other	researchers	who	have	rejected	causality	 as	well	 as	 the	macro-sociological	 perspective.	 In	 reality,	 it	 would	 be	 fruitful	 to	connect	the	study	of	cognitive	processes	with	network	analysis	and	the	sequential	analysis	of	activist	trajectories,	in	order	to	better	reconstruct	the	‘lived	experiences	of	diffusion’,	or	how	ideas,	causes	and	performances	are	adapted	and	transformed.88		 What	to	conclude	from	this	incomplete	and	summary	literature	review?	First	of	all,	the	 scientific	 community’s	 responsiveness	 should	 be	 commended,	 especially	when	 it	 has	been	faced	with	major	events	that	have	threatened	many	a	theory	or	now-shaky	thesis.	We	should	also	highlight	the	stimulating	nature	of	some	of	the	works	cited.	However,	we	have	no	choice	but	to	admit	that	almost	none	of	the	impasses	described	above	have	truly	been	resolved.	Most	studies	are	still	plagued	by	retrospective	prediction	and	the	hunt	for	macro-sociological	causation.	Several	causes	are	mentioned	and	often	‘everything	is	in	everything’,	without	an	undeniable	causal	ordering	being	veritably	demonstrated.	It	remains	to	be	seen	if	this	has	been	caused	by	the	weight	of	respective	research	traditions	or,	more	generally,	to	use	one	of	Pierre	Favre’s	expressions,	by	the	evaporation	of	evidence	in	sociology.	In	another	respect,	 the	analysis	of	revolutionary	 situations	—	 in	 the	 sense	of	 the	 clarification	of	 the	internal	 processes	 and	 sequencing	 of	 these	 situations	 —	 remains	 largely	 unexplored:	individuals	are	everywhere	present,	but	merely	as	shadow	puppets.	What,	then,	should	be	done?	We	argue	that	researchers	should	abandon	the	search	for	causes	and	instead	focus	their	 attention	 on	 situations	 and	 individual	 actions	 in	 said	 situations,	 and	 subsequently	attempt	to	delineate	the	typical	processes	that	lead	to	them.						
																																																								on	 Twitter,	 under	 the	 name	 of	 ‘GeneSharpTaughtMe’.	 See	 Ould	 Mohamedou	 Mohammad-Mahmoud,	 ‘La	démocratie	arabe	au	regard	du	néo-orientalisme’,	Revue	internationale	et	stratégique,	83,	2011,	p.	85–91,	here	p.	86.	88	Isabelle	Sommier,	‘Diffusion	et	circulation	des	mouvements	sociaux’,	in	Olivier	Fillieule,	Éric	Agrikoliansky,	Isabelle	 Sommier	 (ed.),	 Penser	 les	 mouvements	 sociaux.	 Conflits	 sociaux	 et	 contestation	 dans	 les	 sociétés	
contemporaines,	Paris,	La	Découverte,	2010,	p.	101–120,	here	p.	115.	
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PERFORMANCES	AND	PROCESSES		‘It	is	the	details	that	theories	in	history	have	to	grasp	if	they	are	to	be	any	good’.89			 This	 volume	 analyzes	 revolutionary	 situations,	 understood	 as	 instances	 of	 dual	power,90	in	order	to	identify	the	sequences	of	action	—	defined	here	as	performances,	i.e.,	the	cumulative	whole	of	interactions	between	all	the	actors	participating	in	a	conflict	—	that	lead	to	 them.	 The	 concept	 of	 performance	 (also	 borrowed	 from	Charles	 Tilly91)	 signifies	 that	participants	rely	on	engrained	forms	but	also	re-interpret	them,	sometimes	subverting	or	abandoning	them	entirely,	depending	on	their	reasoning,	whose	decisive	factors	are	to	be	found	in	situational	logics.	We	propose	that	the	observation	of	micro	as	well	as	meso	level	interactions	must	allow	us	to	identify	processes,	which	we	define	as	a	series	of	events	capable	of	 altering	 the	 relationships	 between	 given	 groups	 of	 elements,	 in	 a	 similar	 or	 identical	manner,	in	a	variety	of	different	contexts.	These	processes	may	be	relational	(at	the	meso	level	 of	 relations	 between	 individuals	 and	 groups)	 or	 cognitive	 (at	 the	 micro	 level	 of	individual	 perception). 92 	Studying	 performances	 thus	 amounts	 to	 conserving	 the	 most	noteworthy	features	of	certain	sequences,	or	significant	differences	between	sequences,	and	explaining	them	by	identifying	robust	processes	of	relatively	general	scope	at	work	within	these	 sequences.	 More	 specifically,	 beyond	 establishing	 the	 original	 (i.e.	 the	 context)	conditions,	we	must	attempt	to	identify	and	describe	the	processes	which	lead	(or	not)	to	a	revolutionary	situation	—	as	said	situation	cannot	stem	directly	from	its	original	conditions.		 This	type	of	classification	is	in	keeping	with	the	ambitious	project	launched	by	Doug	McAdam,	Sidney	Tarrow	and	Charles	Tilly	which	seeks	to	restructure	the	political	process	model	around	the	study	of	mechanisms	specific	to	different	kinds	of	episodes.93	Although	we																																																									89	Arthur	L.	Stinchcombe,	Theoretical	Methods	in	Social	History,	New	York,	Academic	Press,	1978,	p.	124.	90	See	Charles	Tilly’s	definition	given	in	footnote	9,	p.	769.	91	Charles	Tilly,	Contentious	Performances,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008.	92 	We	 borrow	 here	 the	 distinction	 introduced	 by	 Arthur	 Stinchcombe	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 concept	 of	mechanisms,	 in	The	Logic	of	Social	Research,	Chicago,	Chicago	University	Press,	2005.	He	adds	 the	 level	of	environmental	mechanisms,	which	we	see	as	referring	to	long-term	processes	pertaining	to	different	regimes	of	plasticity	(to	use	a	geological	metaphor).	Therefore,	environmental	mechanisms	such	as	the	nationalization	of	political	spheres	or	de-differentiation	are	long-term	processes	and,	in	the	case	of	revolutionary	situations,	should	be	viewed	as	conducive	elements	(to	use	Smelser’s	term)	existing	outside	of	the	temporal	framework	of	a	crisis.	Thus	defined,	this	term	also	includes	individual	processes	(for	example,	assurance	games)	and	meso	sociological	mechanisms.	We	will	demonstrate	this	below.		93	Doug	McAdam,	 Charles	 Tilly,	 Sidney	 Tarrow,	Dynamics	 of	 Contention,	 Cambridge,	 Cambridge	 University	
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share	their	desire	for	a	dynamic	approach,	it	nevertheless	seems	to	us	that,	its	ambiguities	aside,94	this	model	remains	overtly	causalist	and	structuralist.		 Moreover,	our	approach	relies	on	three	postulates	which	diverge	significantly	from	the	assumptions	made	 in	Dynamics	of	Contention.	 First	of	 all,	we	believe	 that	 in	order	 to	identify	 the	make-up	of	revolutionary	situations	and	consequently,	 to	observe	and	define	their	processes,	we	must	base	our	analysis	on	what	actors	are,	do	and	say	in	situ.	Macro-social	 facts	 are	 nothing	 more	 than	 the	 emergent	 consequences	 of	 individual	 actions,	according	to	an	ultimately	Weberian	reasoning.95			 On	the	other	hand,	in	going	against	a	strong	trend	prevalent	in	the	sociology	of	social	movements	 that	 seeks	 to	 limit	 analysis	 to	 protest	 movements,	 protestors	 and	 their	relationship	to	the	state,96	we	believe	that	processes	and	performances	are	built	relationally	and	require	that	we	take	into	account	all	the	actors	present	in	the	space	of	a	given	conflict.97	Finally,	abandoning	the	search	for	causes	has	led	us	to	consider,	like	Pierre	Favre,	that	‘the	work	of	science	consists	in	studying	two	different	and	successive	states	of	a	system,	isolating	the	pertinent	traits	of	each	and	arriving	at	the	rules	governing	the	transformation	between																																																									Press,	2001;	and	also	‘Methods	for	Measuring	Mechanisms	of	Contention’,	Qualitative	Sociology,	31,	2008,	p.	307–331.	In	addition,	our	definition	of	processes	borrows	from	Tilly’s	definition	of	mechanisms	(Charles	Tilly,	‘L’analyse	historique	des	processus	politiques’,	in	Pascale	Laborier,	Danny	Trom	(ed.),	Historicités	de	l’action	
publique,	Paris,	PUF,	2003,	p.	23–57,	here	p.	27).	94	In	particular,	the	distinction	between	‘episodes’,	‘processes’	and	‘mechanisms’	is	not	consistent,	as	several	critics	have	pointed	out.	See	specifically	 the	critiques	grouped	 together	 in	Mobilization,	8,	2003	and	 in	 the	symposium	on	‘Measuring	Mechanisms	of	Contention’	in	Qualitative	Sociology,	31,	2008.	95	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art	cit.;	William	H.	Sewell	Jr.,	‘Three	Temporalities:	Toward	an	Eventful	Sociology’,	in	Terrence	J.	McDonald	(ed.),	The	Historic	Turn	in	the	Human	Sciences,	Ann	Arbor,	Michigan	University	Press,	1996,	p.	245–280.	In	‘Methods	for	Measuring	Mechanisms	of	Contention’	(art.	cit.),	D.	McAdam,	S.	Tarrow	and	Ch.	Tilly	establish	a	list	of	the	different	means	of	identifying	mechanisms	(for	them)	or	processes	(for	us)	which	emphasizes	 the	 anthropological	 observation	 of	 conflict	 but	 also	 includes	 ‘protest	 events	 analysis’	 and	 the	statistical	method	of	indirect	measurement	—	which	implies	once	again	a	certain	theoretical	inconsistency.	96	See	Verta	Taylor,	‘Plus	ça	change,	plus	c’est	la	même	chose’,	Mobilization,	8,	2003,	p.	122–126,	and	Olivier	Fillieule,	 ‘De	 l’objet	 de	 la	 définition	 à	 la	 définition	 de	 l’objet.	 De	 quoi	 traite	 finalement	 la	 sociologie	 des	mouvements	sociaux	?’,	Politique	et	Sociétés,	28(1),	2009,	p.	15–36,	for	a	more	nuanced	criticism	of	this	aspect	of	‘contentious	politics’.	97	Considering	conflict	between	the	different	protagonists	in	a	balanced	way	is	at	the	heart	of	several	studies	which,	starting	with	research	on	how	public	order	is	maintained	(Olivier	Fillieule,	Donatella	Della	Porta	(ed.),	
Police	et	manifestants,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2006),	have	now	spread	 to	other	aspects	of	 the	social	world.	On	this	subject,	see	the	ambitious	research	project	evoked	by	James	Jasper	in	‘A	Strategic	Approach	to	Collective	Action.	Looking	for	Agency	in	Social-Movement	Choices’,	Mobilization,	9(1),	2004,	p.	1–16,	elaborated	in	Getting	your	Way.	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World,	Chicago,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006,	and	implemented	 in	 Jan	W.	Duyvendak,	 James	M.	 Jasper	 (eds),	Players	 and	Arenas.	 The	 Interactive	Dynamics	 of	
Protest,	forthcoming.	From	another	perspective,	see	also	Neil	Fligstein,	Doug	McAdam,	A	Theory	of	Fields,	New	York,	Oxford	University	Press,	2012.	
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these	 two	 states’.98	Each	 sequence	 of	 actions	 is	modified	 by	 processes	which	 lead	 to	 its	results	(new	states	of	equilibrium),	which	in	turn	help	to	define	the	environmental,	relational	and	 cognitive	 elements	 that	 influence	 the	 calculations	 of	 the	 following	 sequence.	 In	 this	cumulative	perspective	—	which	shares	some	characteristics	with	Paul	Veyne’s	concept	of	narrative	 and	 intrigue99 	—	 previous	 choices	 force	 subsequent	 choices,	 as	 in	 a	 game	 of	chess.100		 In	what	follows,	briefly	recalling	some	of	the	properties	of	revolutionary	situations	will	 allow	 us	 to	 determine	 the	 role	 played	 by	 agency.	 We	 will	 then	 focus	 on	 the	 most	emphasized	 dimension	 of	 this	 volume:	 performances.	 This	 trajectory	 will	 allow	 us	 to	conclude	that	a	certain	number	of	processes	exist	that	imply	rules	governing	transformation	between	states,	and	which	are	likely	to	lead	to	revolutionary	situations.		
The	spread	of	mobilizations	and	how	coalitions	are	formed	
	 Revolutionary	situations	depend	on	a	challenge	to	existing	power	structures	which	spreads	 to	 a	 significant	 percentage	 of	 the	 population	 and	 the	 subsequent	 breakdown	between	traditionally	more	or	less	airtight	divisions	between	social	spaces.	The	majority	of	case	studies	pinpoint	a	small	number	of	properties	shared	by	all	revolutionary	situations:	divisions	or	defections	within	the	central	bodies	of	the	state;	divisions	or	defections	within	security	 forces;	 the	creation	of	 large	 inter-class	coalitions	which	 lead	to	the	spread	of	 the	protest	movement;	and	finally,	the	modularity	of	the	shaping	of	conflicts	(that	is	to	say,	how	situations	are	framed	as	well	as	tactical	repertoires).		 M.	Dobry	has	proposed	formalizing	several	of	these	properties	around	the	concepts	of	multi-sectorial	mobilization	and	political	fluidity.101	Situations	of	political	crisis	are	thus	viewed	as	the	spread	of	a	given	mobilization	to	different	sectors	of	society,	to	such	a	degree	that	the	latter’s	daily	functioning	is	disrupted.	Then	a	window	of	political	fluidity	opens	up,																																																									98	P.	Favre,	Comprendre	le	monde,	op.	cit.,	p.	72.	99	Paul	Veyne,	Comment	on	écrit	 l’histoire,	Paris,	Points	Seuil,	1971,	p.	51–53.	On	cumulative	causation,	 see	Arthur	L.	Stinchcombe,	Theoretical	Methods	in	Social	History,	New	York,	Academic	Press,	1978,	p.	61–63,	and	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	cit.,	p.	147–148.	100 	For	 an	 implementation	 of	 this	 concept	 of	 multi-level	 analysis	 and	 causation	 inspired	 by	 symbolic	interactionism,	see	Olivier	Fillieule,	 ‘Disengagement	from	Radical	Organizations.	A	Process	and	Multi-	Level	Model	 of	 Analysis’,	 in	 Bert	 Klandermans,	 Cornelius	 Van	 Stralen	 (eds),	Movements	 in	 Times	 of	 Transition,	Minnesota,	Minnesota	University	Press,	forthcoming.	101	M.	Dobry,	Sociologie	des	crises	politiques,	op.	cit.	
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during	which	sectors	no	longer	function	according	to	their	usual	logic:	they	become	much	more	interdependent	and	uncertainty	prevails,	insofar	as	the	usual	rules	of	the	game	are	no	longer	respected.			 Merely	describing	the	properties	of	revolutionary	situations	is	not	sufficient.	We	must	also	try	to	understand	the	contexts	 that	encourage	them	and	the	processes	which	 lead	to	them.	This	is	precisely	what	Misagh	Parsa	endeavors	to	do	when	he	suggests	that	attention	should	first	be	paid	to	what	allows	for	the	creation	of	coalitions	across	class	lines.102	Starting	with	 a	 study	 of	 the	 strategies	 employed	 by	 students,	members	 of	 the	 clergy,	 blue-collar	workers	and	business	owners	during	the	Iranian,	Nicaraguan	and	Filipino	revolutions,	Parsa	identifies	both	the	favorable	structural	factors	linked	to	the	form	of	the	state	(more	or	less	interventionist,	more	 or	 less	 exclusive)	 and	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 class	 conflict	 (more	 or	 less	polarizing).	He	also	pinpoints	the	factors	that	relate	directly	to	the	action’s	momentum,	since	once	the	conflict	is	instigated,	the	situation’s	logic	may	transcend	the	decisive	elements	that	produced	it.	For	example,	depending	on	the	form	that	it	takes,	the	use	of	repressive	force	may	 speed	 up	 or	 slow	 down	 the	 creation	 of	 large	 coalitions	 and	 thus	 the	 spread	 of	mobilizations.103			 All	 the	 contributions	gathered	here	underscore	 the	 importance	of	 groups	 that	 are	normally	separated	from	each	other	momentarily	coming	together:	Islamists	and	left-	and	extreme	 left-wing	 activists;	 urban,	 educated	 youths	 and	 ‘slum-dwelling,	 street-smart	dropouts’;	the	downward-trending	middle	classes,	but	also	business	owners	and	intellectual	professionals	 excluded	 from	 power’s	 inner	 sanctum.	 Even	 in	 Bahrain,	 the	 rebellion	 was	poised	to	surpass	the	Sunni/Shiite	divide	—	which	overlaps	with	significant	socio-economic	
																																																								102	Misagh	Parsa,	States,	 Ideologies,	&	Social	Revolutions.	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	 Iran,	Nicaragua,	and	the	
Philippines,	 Cambridge,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2000	 (see	 a	 review	 of	 this	 book	 below,	 p.	 920–923).	Charles	Tilly	comes	to	the	same	conclusion	when	he	analyzes	alliances	between	different	classes	during	the	1830	and	1848	revolutions	in	France	(From	Mobilization,	op.	cit.). 103	This	was	the	case	with	the	Chinese	students’	uprising	in	1989.	Authorities	blocked	inter-class	sympathies	by	treating	students	and	workers	differently.	The	latter	were	generally	punished	more	harshly	and	at	times	were	forcibly	trapped	within	their	factories	during	protest	activities.	To	which	should	also	be	added	the	students’	lack	of	appetite	for	a	communal	struggle.	See	Elizabeth	J.	Perry,	‘Intellectuals	and	Tiananmen.	Historical	Perspective	on	an	Aborted	Revolution’,	in	Daniel	Chirot	(ed.),	The	Crisis	of	Leninism	and	the	Decline	
of	the	Left.	The	Revolutions	of	1989,	Seattle,	University	of	Washington	Press,	1991,	p.	129–146.	On	the	ambivalent	effects	of	repression	with	regard	to	dissenting	groups	as	well	as	individuals,	see	Hélène	Combes,	Olivier	Fillieule,	‘Repression	and	protest.	Structural	models	and	strategic	interactions		Revue	française	de	
science	politique	(English),	61(6),	December	2011,	p.	1-24.	
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cleavages	—	when	its	spread	was	stopped	by	Saudi	Arabia’s	military	intervention.		 Defection	can	be	observed	at	many	different	levels.	First	of	all,	many	analysts	have	elaborated	hypotheses	regarding	the	attitude	of	‘the	army’	in	Tunisia,	Egypt,	Libya	and	Syria.	Four	 salient	 factors	 have	 emerged:	 the	 army’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 government;	 its	involvement	 in	business	affairs;	 its	 level	of	 training;	 and	 finally,	 its	openness	 to	Western	armies.104	Nonetheless,	a	detailed	analysis	still	needs	to	be	conducted	in	order	to	account	for	the	 heterogeneity	 of	 institutions,	 hitherto	 considered	 as	 ‘monolithic	 apparatuses	 of	repression’, 105 	in	 order	 to	 decode,	 sequence	 by	 sequence,	 the	 processes	 which	 have	underpinned	 calculations	 at	 the	 different	 stages	 and	 different	 hierarchical	 levels	 of	revolutionary	 phenomena.	 Secondly,	 researchers	 have	 examined	 dissension	 within	dominant	parties,	the	crumbling	of	their	clientelist	networks	and	how	former	supporters	of	the	regime	may	be	swayed	to	the	side	of	the	insurgency	(in	particular,	see	the	two	papers	about	Tunisia	 in	 this	 issue).106	Other	regimes	 in	 the	 region	may	have	 learnt	 lessons	 from	observing	these	events,	in	the	hopes	of	preventing	internal	divisions	and	military	defection.	Such	 strategies	would	 thus	 amount	 to	 ‘complex,	multilevel	 games’.107	In	 such	 situations,	regimes	try	to	buy	social	peace:	they	create	a	public	discourse	that	‘aim[s]	to	influence	the	strategic	calculus	of	citizens’	by	highlighting	the	risks	of	deep	social	unrest	(fitna).	They	also	organize	 pro-government	 demonstrations	 to	 stem	 the	 tide	 of	 activist	 movements;	 they	condemn	the	sectarian	nature	of	these	protests	and	suggest	their	manipulation	by	the	West;	they	observe	diplomatic	strategies	deployed	in	the	region	and	adapt	accordingly.	In	Morocco,	for	 example,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 strategies,	 the	 government	 has	 offered	reforms	that	are	likely	to	lure	citizens	led	‘astray’	back	to	institutional	politics.	Furthermore,	the	Moroccan	regime	has	increased	official	and	unofficial	negotiations,	as	well	as	exerting	
																																																								104	Jean-François	Coustillière,	‘Les	forces	armées	dans	les	révoltes	arabes’,	Confluence	Méditerranée,	11,	2011,	p.	67–80.	105	V.	Geisser,	A.	Krefa,	‘L’uniforme	ne	fait	plus	le	régime.’,	art.	cit.,	p.	94.	See	also	Anne	Alexander,	‘Brothers-in-Arms?	The	Egyptian	Military,	the	Ikhwan	and	the	Revolutions	of	1952	and	2011’,	The	Journal	of	North	African	
Studies,	16,	2011,	p.	533–554.	106	For	example,	Sarah	Ben	Néfissa,	‘Ces	18	jours	qui	ont	changé	l’Égypte.	Révolution	civile	et	politique’,	Revue	
Tiers	Monde,	special	issue	2011,	p.	227–236,	here	p.	231.	On	the	subject	of	how	local	elites	are	transformed	into	counter-elites,	see	also	Guilain	Denoeux,	Urban	Unrest	in	the	Middle	East,	Albany,	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1993.	107 	Steven	 Heydemann,	 Reinoud	 Leenders,	 ‘Authoritarian	 Learning	 and	 Authoritarian	 Resilience:	 Regime	Responses	to	the	“Arab	Awakening”’,	Globalizations,	8	5),	2011,	p.	647–653,	here	p.	648.	
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more	individual	and	collective	pressure;	it	has	revived	networks	of	local	elected	officials;	it	has	modified	its	repressive	actions	from	one	sequence	of	protest	movements	to	another,	all	the	while	adapting	to	perceived	regional	and	international	pressures	(M.	Bennani-Chraïbi,	M.	Jeghllaly).	In	Yemen,	the	current	regime	has	attempted	to	compensate	for	early	defections	by	establishing	new	internal	support	and	rallying	its	traditional	foreign	allies	—	albeit	not	without	brandishing	the	fear	of	a	security	threat	(L.	Bonnefoy,	M.	Poirier).		 The	 concept	 of	 ‘modularity’	 also	 allows	 us	 to	 highlight	 one	 of	 the	 properties	associated	 with	 the	 spread	 of	 mobilizations. 108 	This	 term	 designates	 the	 diffusion	 of	conceptual	frameworks	and	modes	of	action	throughout	a	national	sphere	and	potentially	—	as	in	the	case	of	the	‘Arab	uprisings’	—	from	one	country	to	another.	Modularity	is	of	course	encouraged	by	emulation;	 that	 is	 to	say,	when	 the	success	of	one	particular	performance	leads	 others	 to	 believe	 that	 it	 would	 obtain	 similar	 success	 elsewhere.	 But	 a	 certain	‘attribution	of	similarity’	is	still	necessary.109	This	identification	is	produced	by	institutional	or	cultural	characteristics	that	are	shared	or	believed	to	be	shared,	as	Y.	El	Chazli	has	shown	in	his	contribution	regarding	the	call	to	protest	on	January	25th,	in	the	wake	of	Ben	Ali’s	rapid	downfall;	however,	a	similar	form	of	identification	also	occurred	when	the	region’s	dictators	learnt	from	their	neighbors’	successes	and	errors	when	attempting	to	restore	the	peace.		 The	 case	 of	 the	 ‘Arab	 uprisings’	 has	 revealed	 how	 the	 attribution	 of	 similarity	 is	largely	the	product	of	the	sidelining,	at	least	temporarily,	of	differences	regarding	methods	and	 objectives	 and	 political	 footwork	 on	 the	 part	 of	 courtiers	 involved	 in	 unifying	perceptions	—	footwork	which	 is	aided	by	the	shape	of	 the	 ‘encampment’,	which	we	will	address	below,	and	 the	 circulation	of	 slogans	within	Tunis’	Kasbah110	and	Egypt’s	Tahrir	Square	 (Y.	 El	 Chazli).	 In	 the	 streets	 of	 Casablanca,	 observing	 the	 morphology	 of	 the	demonstrations	 revealed	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 work	 regarding	 unification:	 coordination	committees	to	decide	on	slogans,	communication	and	logistics—	including	of	course	public	address	 systems	 —	 and	 marshalling	 organization	 (M.	 Bennani-Chraïbi,	 M.	 Jeghllaly).																																																									108	Sidney	Tarrow,	Democracy	and	Disorder,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	1989.	109	Doug	McAdam,	‘Pour	dépasser	l'analyse	structurale	de	l'engagement	militant’,	in	Olivier	Fillieule	(ed.),	Le	
désengagement	militant,	Paris,	Belin,	2005,	p.	49-–4.	The	mechanism	of	the	attribution	of	similarity	means	that	information	alone	does	not	suffice	to	adopt	a	new	idea	or	practice.	In	order	for	diffusion	and	thus	imitation	to	occur,	potential	imitators	must	at	least	partially	identify	with	the	original	actors.	 110	Choukri	Hmed,	‘“Si	le	peuple	un	jour	aspire	à	vivre,	le	destin	se	doit	de	répondre”’,	Les	Temps	modernes,	664,	2011,	p.	4–20.	
Revue française de science politique, 2012/5-6 (vol. 62) 
	 23	
Likewise,	in	Yemen	efforts	were	deployed	to	keep	objectives	broad	and	vague,	thus	allowing	all	 kinds	 of	meaning	 to	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 protests	 and	 strong,	 visible	 identities	 to	 be	preserved	 (L.	 Bonnefoy,	 M.	 Poirier).	 The	 work	 of	 political	 unification	 is	 nowhere	 more	apparent	 than	when	 it	 falls	apart,	 like	when	a	small	number	of	 Islamist	students	in	Tunis	chanted	la	ilaha	illa	Allah	to	counter	the	left-wing	slogans	on	January	14th	(A.	Allal),	or	when,	for	example,	after	Mubarak	was	ousted,	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	and	the	Salafists	partnered	up	with	the	military.	Tahrir	Square	then	became	a	site	of	confrontation	between	secular	and	‘religious’	 groups,	 between	 ‘moderate’	 revolutionaries	who	 sought	 a	 return	 to	 peace	 and	‘radical’	 revolutionaries	 who	 wanted	 to	 force	 the	 army	 to	 retreat	 into	 its	 barracks. 111	Nonetheless,	 recognizing	 the	work	 of	 political	 unification	 does	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 a	strategic	bias;	with	regard	to	Tunisia,	M.	Béchir	Ayari	emphasizes	that	reducing	the	number	of	grievances	to	a	lowest	common	denominator	—	‘dignity’	or	‘get	out!’	—	was	not	merely	‘intentional’,	 but	 also	 relates	 to	 the	 country’s	 much	 longer	 history	 of	 socio-political	conflicts.112			
The	Third	Man		 Not	without	irony,	Rod	Aya	underscores	how	although	the	sociology	of	revolutions	consistently	 condemns	 rational	 choice	 theory,	 it	 does	 not	 propose	 a	 general	 alternative	theory	of	human	action;	even	in	the	most	structuralist	of	revolutionary	models,	individuals	are	at	one	point	or	another	called	upon	to	explain	‘the	transition	from	word	to	deed’,	thus	surreptitiously	reintroducing	the	rejected	theories	through	the	back	door.113			 It	is	thus	not	surprising	that	under	such	conditions,	the	existing	literature	ceaselessly	swings	between	rather	unconvincing	binary	oppositions:	the	spontaneity	of	the	masses	and	emotional	contagion,	versus	the	calculated	and	manipulative	actions	of	group	leaders;114	the	
																																																								111	Khaled	Dawoud,	 ‘Tahrir	 Countershow	of	 Force’,	Al	Ahram	Weekly,	 August	 11–17,	 2011,	 <http://weekly.	ahram.org.eg/2011/1060/fr1.htm>.	112	Michaël	Béchir	Ayari,	‘Des	maux	de	la	misère	aux	mots	de	la	“dignité”‘,	Revue	Tiers	Monde,	special	issue	2011,	p.	209–218,	here	p.	216.	113	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	cit.	114	On	approaches	regarding	emotional	contagion,	see	the	critical	synthesis	elaborated	by	Susanna	Barrows,	
Miroirs	déformants.	Réflexions	sur	la	foule	en	France	à	la	fin	du	19e	siècle,	Paris,	Aubier,	1990.	On	the	opposition	between	manipulated	masses	 and	manipulative	 leaders,	 in	 particular	with	 regard	 to	 police	 reasoning,	 see	Olivier	Fillieule,	Stratégies	de	la	rue.	Les	manifestations	en	France,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	1997.	
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prevalence	 of	 tactical	 choices	 and	 innovation	 versus	 reliance	 on	 engrained	 forms	 and	cognitive	shortcuts	during	situations	of	structural	uncertainty.115		 This	 systematic	 ambiguity	 is	 fostered	 by	 both	 the	 difficulty	 of	 perceiving	 the	structured	nature	of	crowd	behavior116	and	the	ambivalence	exhibited	 in	 the	discourse	of	witnesses	and	actors	themselves.117	In	her	reading	of	the	Civil	Rights	Movement’s	‘sit-ins’	at	the	beginning	of	the	1960s,	F.	Polletta	gives	us	a	striking	example	of	this	phenomenon,	actors	oscillating	 between	 a	 feeling	 of	 spontaneity	 and	 unpredictability,	 and	 the	 simultaneous	recognition	of	the	crucial	role	played	by	the	movement’s	leaders	and	their	preparations.118	Likewise,	the	‘Arab	uprisings’	provide	us	with	a	plethora	of	examples,	whether	they	take	the	form	of	 participant	 interviews	 or	 journalistic	 reports,	 filmed	 and	 broadcast	 by	Arab	 and	international	media.119		 M.	Dobry’s	concept	of	‘calculation	evaporation’,	which	is	halfway	between	the	inertia	of	systems	of	disposition	(i.e.	habitus)	and	the	intelligibility	break,	seems	to	us	quite	useful	here.	By	 relying	on	Goffman’s	notion	of	 ‘mutual	 anticipation’,	Dobry	 suggests	 that	during	periods	of	broad	desectorization,	where	structural	uncertainty	prevails,	participants	base	their	decisions	to	commit	or	not	on	the	information	they	gather	from	the	attitudes	of	other	actors	—	all	of	 this	occurring	 in	a	 structurally	determined	but	malfunctioning	normative	framework	which	 is	 about	 to	 partially	 or	 completely	 collapse.120	‘From	 this	 perspective,																																																									115	Michel	Dobry	has	emphasized	how	the	‘heroic	illusion’	was	embedded	in	works	on	crisis	situations,	as	well	as	the	dead-ends	to	which	it	led.	Such	criticism	can	extend	to	a	certain	number	of	interpretations	of	the	event	as	 a	 ‘break	 in	 intelligibility’,	 opening	 up	a	 situation	 in	which	 invention	dominates	 and	 frees	 itself	 from	all	structural	determination.	For	example,	Alban	Bensa,	Éric	Fassin,	 ‘Les	sciences	sociales	 face	à	 l’événement’,	
Terrain,	38,	2002,	p.	5–20.	116	Clark	McPhail,	The	Myth	 of	 the	Madding	Crowd,	 New	York,	 Aldine/De	Gruyter,	 1991,	 p.	 158–84;	Olivier	Fillieule,	 ‘The	 Independent	 Psychological	 Effects	 of	 Participation	 in	 Demonstrations’,	 Mobilization.	 An	
International	Journal,	17(3),	2012,	p.	489–502.	117 	We	 refer	 of	 course	 to	 Immanuel	 Kant’s	 reflections	 on	 revolutionary	 enthusiasm	 in	 The	 Conflict	 of	 the	
Faculties	(11th	section).	Specifically	on	the	subject	of	the	French	Revolution,	see	also	the	actors’	declarations	reproduced	and	analyzed	 in	Michel	Vovelle,	La	mentalité	 révolutionnaire,	Paris,	Messidor/Éditions	sociales,	1985,	and	also	the	pages	devoted	by	Timothy	Tackett	to	the	night	of	August	4th,	1789,	marked	by	 ‘a	utterly	unanticipated	spirit	of	enthusiasm	and	self-sacrifice’,	in	Becoming	a	Revolutionary.	The	Deputies	of	the	French	
National	Assembly	and	the	Emergence	of	a	Revolutionary	Culture	(1789–1790),	Princeton,	Princeton	University	Press,	1996,	p.	167. 118	Francesca	Polletta,	‘“It	was	Like	a	Fever...”.	Narrative	and	Identity	in	Social	Protest’,	Social	Problems,	45(2),	May	1998,	p.	137–159.	119	For	example,	Stephano	Savona’s	beautiful	 film	(Tahrir,	2011)	and	 the	eyewitness	accounts	published	 in	Hatem	Rushdy,	18	days	in	Tahrir.	Stories	from	Egypt’s	Revolution,	Hong	Kong,	Haven	Books,	2011.	120	In	his	book	on	‘collective	abdications’,	Ivan	Ermakoff	offers	a	similar	analysis	of	decision-making	processes	in	these	situations	of	political	fluidity.	He	bases	himself	on	game	theory,	and	thus	does	not	link	together	the	
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invention	 is	 neither	 the	 pure	 and	 simple	 replica	 of	 what	 has	 been	 internalized,	 nor	 the	sudden	and	mysterious	eruption,	ex	nihilo,	of	innovation’.121		 Admitting	this	also	means	that	rational	choice	theories	should	not	be	dismissed	so	quickly.	In	fact,	they	should	be	given	credit	for	having	determined	that	individual	actions	are	the	combined	result	of	rational	choice	(which	does	not,	nevertheless,	explain	what	motivates	such	choices)	and	the	hope	of	success	(which	does	not	presuppose	the	‘reasonable’	nature	of	said	 choices).122	Starting	with	 these	 two	premises,	which	we	wholeheartedly	accept,	 it	 is	possible	to	proceed	to	a	reflection	on	the	micro-foundations	of	revolutionary	action	and	on	aggregation	mechanisms	in	situations	of	uncertainty.		 Those	 studies	which	 adhere	 to	 rational	 choice	 theory	outline	 a	 certain	 number	 of	processes	specific	to	revolutionary	situations	that	can	help	us,	in	an	ideal-typical	manner,	to	understand	how	actors	calculate	their	moves.	We	refer	specifically	to	critical	mass	theory,	which	 predicts	 that	 one’s	 decision	 to	 get	 involved	 in	 an	 event	 depends	 on	 the	 expected	participation	 of	 a	 sufficiently	 large	 number	 of	 people, 123 	and	 is	 linked	 to	 several	 other	results,124	in	particular	to	propositions	on	the	gap	between	private	and	public	preferences	in	 authoritarian	 states,	 a	 discrepancy	 which	 is	 bolstered	 by	 fear	 of	 repression.125 	As	 a	consequence,	 when	 a	 revolutionary	 situation	 is	 triggered	 and	 individuals	 feel	 like	 their	private	preferences	regarding	a	regime	change	are	shared	by	many	others,	they	may,	once	a	
																																																								cognitive	 explanation	with	 his	 contextual	 analysis.	 In	 particular,	 he	 develops	 the	 idea	 that,	 in	 high-stakes	situations	where	the	outcome	is	uncertain	until	the	very	end,	the	processes	of	alignment	among	participants	constitute	 a	 decisive	 explanatory	 factor.	 See	 Ivan	 Ermakoff,	 Ruling	 Oneself	 Out.	 A	 Theory	 of	 Collective	
Abdications,	Durham,	Duke	University	Press,	2008	(cf.	below	for	a	review	of	this	book,	p.	923–926).	121	M.	Dobry,	Sociologie	des	crises	politiques,	op.	cit.,	p.	260.	122	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	cit.,	p.	148.	Thanks	to	the	work	of	Evans	Pritchard,	we	now	know	the	degree	to	which	 the	 rationality	 of	 actions	 is	 always	 relative	 to	 cognitive	 frames	 of	 reference.	 See	 Evans	 Pritchard,	
Witchcraft,	Oracles	and	Magic	among	the	Azande,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	1937.	123	Gerard	Marwell,	 Pamela	Oliver,	The	Critical	Mass	 in	Collective	 Action.	A	Micro-Social	 Theory,	 Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1993.	This	 theory	argues	 the	exact	opposite	of	 the	Olsonian	paradox	without,	nevertheless,	invalidating	it,	as	it	only	pertains	to	situations	of	great	uncertainty.		124 	See	 Mark	 I.	 Lichbach,	 The	 Rebel’s	 Dilemma,	 Ann	 Arbor,	 University	 of	 Michigan	 Press,	 1995,	 for	 a	 very	thorough	critique.	125	Timur	Kuran,	Private	 Truths,	 Public	 Lies.	 The	 Social	 Consequences	 of	 Preference	 Falsification,	 Cambridge,	Harvard	University	Press,	1995.	
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certain	 threshold	 is	 crossed,126 	very	 rapidly	 and	 in	 large	 numbers	 join	 the	 cause:	 thus	providing	an	explanation	to	the	‘revolutionary	bandwagon’	phenomenon.127		 Numerous	personal	accounts	illustrate	this	phenomenon.	For	A.	El	Aswany,	January	25th	was	a	day	like	any	other	—	until	about	mid-day.	Turning	on	his	television,	the	novelist	saw	 that	a	 ‘miracle’	had	happened,	 that	Egyptians	had	massively	gathered	 to	protest	 the	current	regime.128	He	immediately	got	dressed	to	join	the	protesters	on	Tahrir	Square.	In	his	contribution	to	this	study,	Y.	El	Chazli	shows	that	the	discrepancy	between	the	size	of	the	January	 25th	 protests	 and	 the	 intimacy	 of	 the	 usual	 sit-ins	 observed	 by	 ‘novices’	 had	 a	galvanizing	effect.	C.	Hmed	notes	that	in	Sidi	Bouzid,	Ben	Ali’s	January	13th	speech	had	more	of	a	motivating	than	demotivating	effect	on	the	population,	precisely	due	to	this	feeling	of	anticipation.	Likewise,	in	Morocco,	many	people	rallied	to	the	enthusiasm	drummed	up	by	the	 pioneers	 of	 the	 February	 20	Movement	 and	 the	 earlier	 leaders	 of	 the	 ‘Arab	 Spring’	movement,	 once	 preliminary	 successes	 were	 witnessed.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 however,	 the	ebbing	of	the	movement	coincided	with	a	sort	of	‘counter-bandwagon	effect’:	the	feeling	that	the	movement	had	lost	the	fight	and	that	history	was	slowing	down	contributing	to	general	demotivation.		 Beyond	the	mechanisms	that	it	outlines	in	a	stylized	manner,	however,	rational	choice	theory	is	of	little	help	when	attempting	to	reconstruct	how	actors	make	calculations	in	situ.	First	of	all,	rational	choice	theory	is	primarily	interested	in	predicting	commitment,	based	on	the	identification	of	pre-existing	preferences.	For	our	purposes	here,	all	the	depth	and	particularity	of	events	is	not	accounted	for	in	such	an	analysis.129	In	effect,	individuals	adjust	their	 calculations	 based	 on	 cost/benefit	 analyses	 which	 are	 indexed	 on	 highly	 volatile	circumstances:	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	 we	must	 address.	 In	 this	 vein,	 T.	 Tackett	 offers	 a	considerably	 more	 convincing	 approach	 to	 calculations	 in	 revolutionary	 situations.	 He																																																									126 	Mark	 Granovetter,	 Roland	 Soong,	 ‘Threshold	 Models	 of	 Diffusion	 and	 Collective	 Behavior’,	 Journal	 of	
Mathematical	Sociology,	9,	1983,	p.	165–179;	Thomas	C.	Schelling,	‘Hockey	Helmets,	Concealed	Weapons	and	Daylight	Saving’,	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution,	17(3),	1973,	p.	381–428.	127	On	the	concepts	of	‘bandwagon’,	‘assurance	games’	and	‘de-assurance	games’,	see	Dennis	Chong,	Collective	
Action	and	 the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	Chicago,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1991,	 and	Rasma	Karklins,	Roger	Petersen,	 ‘Decision	Calculus	of	Protesters	and	Regimes:	Eastern	Europe	1989’,	The	Journal	of	Politics,	55(3),	August	1993,	p.	588–614.	128	Alaa	El	Aswany,	Chroniques	de	la	Révolution	égyptienne,	Arles,	Actes	Sud,	2011,	p.	13.	129	Charles	Kurzman,	 ‘Can	Understanding	Undermine	Explanation?	The	Confused	Experience	of	Revolution’,	
Philosophy	of	the	Social	Sciences,	34(3),	September	2004,	p.	328–351.	
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meticulously	reconstructs	the	means	by	which	members	of	parliament	or	general	assemblies	gradually	become	revolutionaries.	This	involved	studying	the	transformation	of	their	values	and	modes	of	thinking	in	all	aspects	of	their	lives,	from	theoretical	ideas	to	financial	worries,	often	expressed	in	their	personal	correspondence.130	Y.	El	Chazli	has	similarly	shown	how	Tahrir	Square	witnessed	the	gradual	birth	of	a	revolutionary	psychology	and	culture.		 Secondly,	 the	 anthropological	 foundations	 of	 rational	 choice	 theory	 often	circumscribe	 it	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 cognitivism,	 even	 when	 attempts	 are	 made	 to	‘contextualize’	 the	 explanatory	models.	We	 are	 therefore	 still	 very	 far	 from	obtaining	 an	adequate	account	of	actors’	socio-cultural	anchors,	be	it	concerning	the	nature	and	strength	of	pre-existing	ties,	of	the	opportunities	and	obligations	that	the	latter	engender,	or	of	their	spatial	anchoring	in	cost/benefit	matrices.131	Furthermore,	and	here	we	are	in	line	with	the	first	 line	 of	 critique,	 a	 very	 large	 number	 of	 historians	 have	 demonstrated	 how	 the	momentum	of	riots	or	rebellions	also	significantly	contributes	to	the	redefining	of	social	ties	and	 forms	 of	 inter-individual	 attachment,	 thus	 making	 it	 futile	 to	 try	 to	 reconstruct	cost/benefit	structures	by	means	of	static,	one-dimensional	models.132		 By	 seeking	 to	 describe	 as	 accurately	 as	 possible	 the	 practical	 dilemmas	 faced	 by	actors	at	every	moment	in	time	and	by	attempting	to	reconstruct	their	motivations	by	closely	following	individual	actions	and	thoughts,	we	can	hope	to	replace	the	missing	‘third	man’133	at	the	center	of	every	explanation	with	an	actor	who	acts	for	‘good	reasons’	(whether	these	seem	rational	or	not	in	the	eyes	of	the	researcher	and	the	world,	and	even	if	they	are	only	loosely	linked	with,	if	not	downright	contrary	to,	the	causes	they	serve).		
	
	
																																																								130	T.	 Tackett,	Becoming	 a	Revolutionary,	 op.	 cit.;	 in	 a	 completely	 different	 context,	 see	 also	 Christopher	R.	Browning,	Ordinary	Men.	Reserve	Police	Battalion	101	and	the	Final	Solution	in	Poland,	New	York,	Harper	Collins,	1992. 131	Roger	 V.	 Gould,	 Insurgent	 Identities.	 Class,	 Community,	 and	 Protest	 in	 Paris	 from	 1848	 to	 the	 Commune,	Chicago,	 The	 University	 of	 Chicago	Press,	 1995;	 Karl	 Dieter	 Opp,	 Peter	 Voss,	 Christiane	 Gern,	Origins	 of	 a	
Spontaneous	 Revolution,	 Ann	 Arbor,	Michigan	 University	 Press,	 1995;	 Steven	 Pfaff,	 ‘Collective	 Identity	 and	Informal	Groups	in	Revolutionary	Mobilization.	East	Germany	in	1989’,	Social	Forces,	75(1),	1996,	p.	91–118.	132	For	example,	William	M.	Reddy,	‘The	Textile	Trade	and	the	Language	of	the	Crowd	at	Rouen,	1752–1871’,	
Past	and	Present,	74(1),	1977,	p.	62–89,	here	p.	82–83;	Cynthia	A.	Bouton,	The	Flour	War.	Gender,	Class,	and	
Community	in	Late	Ancien	Régime	French	Society,	Philadelphia,	Penn	State	Press,	1993,	chap.	5.	133	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	cit.	
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Revolutionary	performances		 Under	the	guise	of	unpredictability	and	collective	effervescence,	events	paradoxically	fall	 within	 prescribed	 norms	 and	 are	 fostered	 by	 modes	 of	 action	 drawn	 from	 select	repertoires,	which	we	shall	attempt	to	describe	as	thoroughly	as	possible.	This	is	not	to	deny	the	 potentially	 transformative	 nature	 of	 certain	 characteristic	 elements	 of	 revolutionary	situations.	Quite	the	opposite:	it	seems	to	us	that	we	can	best	understand	the	rules	governing	the	 plasticity	 of	 structures	when	we	 recognize	 their	 ‘sensitivity	 to	mobilizations,	 actors’	tactical	activity	and	the	blows	exchanged’.134	From	our	point	of	view,	although	revolutionary	situations	 do	 amount	 to	 exchanges	 governed	 by	 interactional	 logic,	 attention	 must	nevertheless	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 observable	 behaviors	 are	 historically	established,	since	the	social	norms	involved	therein	are	and	have	been	the	object	of	gradual,	multiple	and	simultaneous	developments.135		 These	comments	call	for	a	close	observation	of	revolutionary	performances,	which	are	subject	to	two	competing	rationales.	On	the	one	hand,	actors	—	both	protesters	and	the	forces	of	law	and	order	—	often	participate	in	structurally	regulated	interaction	sequences;	these	attest	to	the	existence	of	a	shared	understanding	of	the	situation,	and	thus	of	explicit	and	 implicit	 rules	of	 the	game	 (legal	 frameworks,	 social	mores)	bolstered	by	 local	police	culture	and	protest	history,	with	all	their	attendant	tactics	and	predictable	moves.136	On	the	other	hand,	the	multiplicity	of	actors	present	and	the	complexity	of	the	fights	for	meaning	that	occur	during	interactions	and	interpretations	introduce	large	margins	of	uncertainty.	In	other	words,	 only	 a	 blow-by-blow	 contextualized	 analysis	 of	 a	 situation	 can	 allow	 us	 to	understand	how	protest	dramaturgy	can	activate	and	orient	a	revolutionary	situation	—	so	
																																																								134 	Michel	 Dobry.	 ‘Le	 politique	 dans	 ses	 états	 critiques.	 Retour	 sur	 quelques	 aspects	 de	 l’hypothèse	 de	continuité’,	 in	Marc	Bessin,	 Claire	Bidart,	Michel	 Grossetti	 (ed.),	Bifurcations.	 Les	 sciences	 sociales	 face	 aux	
ruptures	et	à	l’événement,	Paris,	La	Découverte,	2010,	p.	64–88,	here	p.	79–80.	On	the	relationships	between	structures	and	events,	see	also	Marshall	Sahlins,	How	‘Natives’	Think.	About	Captain	Cook,	for	Example,	Chicago,	The	 University	 of	 Chicago	 Press,	 1995;	 William	 H.	 Sewell	 Jr.,	 Logics	 in	 History.	 Social	 Theory	 and	 Social	
Transformation,	 Chicago,	 Chicago	 University	 Press,	 2005.	 More	 recently,	 see	 Stéphane	 Latté,	 ‘La	 force	 de	l’“événement”	est-elle	un	artefact	?’,	Revue	française	de	science	politique,	62(3),	June	2012,	p.	409–432.	135	Erving	Goffman,	Behavior	 in	 Public	 Places,	Glencoe,	 Free	 Press,	 1963,	 p.	 12;	 C.	McPhail,	The	Myth	 of	 the	
Madding	Crowd,	op.	cit.,	p.	158–184;	Nicolas	Mariot,	‘Does	Acclamation	Equal	Agreement?	Rethinking	Collective	Effervescence	Through	the	Case	of	the	Presidential	“Tour	de	France”	during	the	20th	Century’,	Theory	&	Society,	40(2),	March	2010,	p.	191–221;	Olivier	Fillieule,	Danielle	Tartakowsky,	Demonstrations,	Winnipeg,	Fernwood	Publishing,	2013.	136	O.	Fillieule,	Stratégies	de	la	rue,	op.	cit.	
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long	as	we	take	into	account	the	actions	of	demonstrators,	the	authorities	being	challenged	
and	the	forces	of	order.		 Specialists	in	Northern	African	and	Middle	Eastern	social	movements	have	remarked	how	the	observable	behaviors	of	demonstrations	are	historically	established	and	how	the	social	 norms	 displayed	 therein	 are	 borrowed	 from	 the	 knowledge	 of	 previous	 struggles,	either	 directly	 reused	 by	 activists	 or	 indirectly	 transmitted	 to	 younger	 generations. 137	Whether	in	Tunisia,	Egypt,	Morocco	or	Yemen,	the	turn	being	taken	by	protest	movements	must	be	linked	to	previous	demonstrations:	actions	supporting	‘Arabic’	or	‘Islamic’	causes;	unprecedented	protests	 in	Redeyef	 and	Gafsa	 in	2008	and	 in	Ben	Guerdane	 in	2010;	 the	growing	wave	of	labor	strikes	in	Egypt,	starting	in	2004;	protests	against	the	high	cost	of	living,	such	as	those	occurring	in	Morocco	until	2009;	and	the	development	of	groups	which	transcend	 ideological	 cleavages	 (such	 as	 Kifaya,	 the	 April	 6th	 group	 and	 the	 National	Association	 for	 Change	 in	 Egypt,	 as	 well	 as	 various	 human	 rights	 organizations	 across	different	 countries).	 These	 protests	 have	 allowed	 for	 the	 partial	 overlap	 between	 actors	belonging	to	competing	socio-political	networks	(see	the	insights	contributed	by	M.	Bennani-Chraïbi	and	M.	Jeghllaly,	C.	Hmed	and	Y.	El	Chazli).	They	have	likewise	encouraged	millions	of	people	to	learn	how	to	engage	in	collective	mobilization;	in	addition,	such	protests	also	allow	 hardened	 activists	 to	 learn	 from	 their	 previous	 mistakes,	 to	 innovate	 in	 order	 to	surprise	 the	 forces	 of	 law	 and	 order	 (see.	 C.	 Hmed;	 Y.	 El	 Chazli;	M.	 Bennani-Chraïbi,	M.	Jeghllaly).	 In	 addition,	 we	 should	 not	 overlook	 the	 know-how	 acquired	 or	 the	 informal	networks	constructed	by	the	 football	clubs’	Ultras,	or	more	generally,	 throughout	sites	of	urban	dissidence	(see	A.	Allal).138	Finally,	we	must	take	into	account	everything	that	can	be	gleaned	and	adapted	from	one	movement	to	another	—	including	transnationally	—	for	both	protestors	and	security	forces.		 But	actors’	behaviors	do	not,	however,	 solely	 stem	 from	 learnt	 forms	—	 they	also	depend	 on	 situational	 logic,	marked	 by	 a	 profusion	 of	 critical	moments.	We	 can	 see	 this	
																																																								137	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	Olivier	Fillieule	(ed.),	Résistances	et	protestations	dans	le	monde	musulman,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2003;	Joel	Beinin,	Frédéric	Vairel	(eds),	Social	Movements,	Mobilization	and	Contestation	
in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	Stanford,	Stanford	University	Press,	2011.	The	same	goes	for	the	forces	of	law	and	order,	which	have	also	acquired	know-how	from	past	conflicts.	138	Ashraf	El-Sherif,	‘The	Ultras’	Politics	of	Fun	Confront	Tyranny’,	Jadaliyya,	February	2012,	<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4243/the-ultras-politics-of-fun-confront-tyranny>. 
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clearly	 in	 the	 ambivalent	 effects	 of	 repression,	 which	 can	 radicalize	 opponents	 by	establishing	binary	structures139	that	accelerate	the	crumbling	of	authoritarian	legitimacy;	this	may	consequently	drive	participants	to	go	far	beyond	their	initial	goals	(see	A.	Allal	and	C.	 Hmed),	 even	 though	 for	 the	 authorities	 in	 power,	 indiscriminate	 violence	 and	 savage	repression	sought	to	reduce	the	strength	and	number	of	protests.		 This	 phenomenon	 was	 especially	 evident	 throughout	 a	 whole	 series	 of	 cathartic	events	that	acted	as	‘turning	points’	(like	Egypt’s	‘Friday	of	Anger’,	on	January	28th,	2011,	see	Y.	El	Chazli),	marked	by	the	disappearance	of	security	forces,	the	ambiguous	role	of	the	army	and	the	establishment	of	neighborhood	self-defense	committees.140	In	Yemen,	on	March	18th,	2011,	the	‘Friday	of	Dignity’	saw	security	forces	intervene	to	oust	protestors	from	Taghyir	Square	and	more	than	fifty	individuals	were	assassinated	by	isolated	gunmen,	thus	spurring	on	 the	movement	 and	 speeding	 up	 the	 rate	 of	 defections.	 In	Manama,	 although	 the	 first	protests	 on	 January	 14th	 in	 2011	 only	 numbered	 a	 few	 hundred,	 the	 repression	 they	provoked	played	a	significant	part	in	inciting	revolt.	The	installation	of	an	encampment	at	the	Pearl	Roundabout	and	its	subsequent	repression	transformed	the	nature	of	the	protest	in	just	two	days.	First	of	all,	demands	became	increasingly	radical,	moving	from	requests	for	reform	to	calls	 for	a	regime	change.	Secondly,	having	previously	been	confined	to	human	rights	activists,	 the	protest	movement	spread	to	 students,	 engineers,	professors,	 lawyers,	and	 even	members	 of	 the	 opposition:	 trade	 union	 activists,	 Shiite	 religious	 leaders.	 This	demonstrated	that	the	spirit	of	rebellion	had	permeated	throughout	many	different	social	classes	and	environments.	This	handful	of	examples	illustrates	the	self-propelling	dynamics	of	 transformative	events.	The	very	strength	of	events	 leads	participants	 to	go	 far	beyond	what	they	had	initially	envisioned,	let	alone	dreamt	of	(A.	Allal,	C.	Hmed,	Y.	El	Chazli).	And	although	 the	 protestors	 of	 Sidi	 Bouzid,	 Tunis’s	 Kasbah,	 Tahrir	 Square	 and	 Deraa	 are	remarkably	aware	of	 the	historical	significance	of	 their	actions,	 they	are	nonetheless	still	unable	of	explaining	 it,	 as	 the	situation’s	 logic	surpasses	their	 individual	calculations	and	expectations.	
																																																								139	C.	Alexander,	Performative	Revolution	in	Egypt,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	140	J.	Gelvin,	The	Arab	Uprisings,	op.	cit.,	p.	46;	H.	Rushdy,	18	days	in	Tahrir,	op.	cit. 
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	 Given	a	certain	 limited	set	of	circumstances,	 the	choice	of	one	 form	of	action	over	another	stems	 from	both	 tactical	 and	 strategic	 concerns,	 and	 from	an	attempt	at	 framing	undertaken	 by	 protestors	 in	 order	 to	 give	meaning	 to	 their	movement.	 During	 the	 Arab	uprisings,	 heterogeneous	 modes	 of	 action	 have	 been	 observed:	 general	 strikes,	 mass	protests,	political	 funerals,	manifestations,	riots	and	even	guerrilla	actions.	This	variety	 is	tied	to	the	actors’	politicization,	their	pre-existing	networks,	the	places	they	inhabit	and	the	timing	 they	 chose	 for	 protest	 movements.	 The	 Tunisian	 examples	 in	 this	 volume	demonstrate	this	clearly.	The	‘débrouillard’	(or	street-smart)	youths	coordinate	thanks	to	neighborly,	 friendly	or	 familial	 relations;	 they	 tend	 to	 engage	 (usually	 at	 night)	 in	 urban	guerrilla	actions	against	the	police	on	the	streets	of	their	neighborhoods.	Union	leaders	and	members	of	the	political	opposition,	on	the	other	hand,	mobilize	through	their	pre-existing	activist	networks	and	organize	(daytime)	events	inspired	by	the	lessons	of	the	past:	general	strikes,	sit-ins,	solidarity	caravans	and	protests	along	major	city	streets.	Nevertheless,	this	variety	does	not	prevent	some	amount	of	overlap	from	occurring.		 For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Tunisian,	 Egyptian,	 Bahraini,	 Libyan	 and	 Yemeni	uprisings,	all	of	the	events	converged	around	the	physical	presence	of	encampments.	This	allows	us	to	 interpret	 this	mode	of	action	as	an	effective	means	 for	 the	spread	of	protest	movements. 141 	Tahrir	 Square	 in	 Cairo	 is	 the	 most	 evocative	 illustration	 of	 this	phenomenon:142	the	 ‘Egyptian	Revolution’	symbolically	 took	shape	there	and	 its	 fate	now	seems	completely	intertwined	with	the	square’s	life.143	This	phenomenon	—	and	the	same	sentiment	 —	 could	 also	 be	 observed	 in	 Tunis’	 Kasbah,	 Sanaa’s	 Taghyeer	 Square	 and	Manama’s	Pearl	Roundabout,	but	also	in	Benghazi’s	Al-Shajara	Square,	in	Tripoli’s	Martyrs’	Square,	etc.144	In	non-democratic	contexts	where	participating	in	a	street	demonstration	can																																																									141	See	the	conclusion	to	Olivier	Fillieule	and	Danielle	Tartakowsky’s	Demonstrations,	op.	cit.	142	This	 form	of	action	 is	 so	prevalent	and	widespread	 that	 is	has	often	caused	other	 forms	of	 revolt	 to	be	overlooked,	both	in	the	eyes	of	outside	commentators	as	well	as	of	participants.	It	is	just	as	likely	that	attention	was	very	quickly	concentrated	on	capital	cities,	neglecting	the	contribution	of	other	cities	to	the	momentum	of	protests.	143	In	the	eyewitness	accounts	collected	in	18	days	in	Tahrir,	the	persons	interviewed	were	firmly	convinced	that	everything	was	staked	on	Tahrir	Square,	and	that	nowhere	else	in	Egypt	had	much	importance.		144	This	form	of	action	was	not	invented	in	Tunis’	Kasbah	or	on	Tahrir	Square	and	thus	merits	an	explanation.	The	first	example	that	comes	to	mind	is	that	of	Tiananmen	Square	in	1989,	but	we	can	also	recall	more	recent	movements	like	Los	Indignados	and	Occupy	in	Europe,	the	US	and	Israel.	Moreover,	these	spaces	did	not	become	epicenters	of	rebellion	overnight:	like	Cairo’s	Tahrir	Square	or	Casablanca’s	Mohammed	V	Square	(Lahmam	Plaza),	they	had	very	often	been	construed	as	symbolic	sites	of	activism	well	before	2011.		
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be	very	risky	for	oneself	and	one’s	loved	ones,	occupying	a	public	space	is	a	gesture	that	is	both	symbolically	disruptive	and	particularly	adapted	to	the	limits	imposed	by	a	repressive	regime	(see	in	particular	the	cases	of	Egypt	and	Yemen).	First	of	all,	encampments	allow	for	the	establishment	of	 ‘liberated’	spaces	that	help	to	overcome	fear	and	anchor	the	protest	over	time	(somewhat	like	the	older	technique	of	the	barricade).145	Encampments	are	also	a	way	 to	 construct	 a	unified	 image	 for	 the	movement,	 supported	by	a	mass	—	and	 largely	peaceful	—	uprising	of	all	sections	of	society	against	an	illegitimate	regime.146	Finally,	as	Y.	El	 Chazli,	 L.	 Bonnefoy	 and	 M.	 Poirier	 have	 shown	 in	 this	 volume,	 encampments	 are	 a	powerful	tool	to	stoke	revolutionary	enthusiasm,	particularly	by	strengthening	an	‘esprit	de	corps’	in	small	groups.	147	Two	elements	are	crucial	here.			 First	 of	 all,	 due	 to	 its	 longer	 timeframe	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationships	 it	establishes,	 camping	 out	 in	 a	 protest	 site	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 greater	 effect	 than	 sporadic	participation	in	street	demonstrations,	no	matter	how	violent	or	engaged	these	may	be.	This	is	attested	to	by	a	number	of	different	elements,	including	first	and	foremost	Facebook	posts	and	Twitter	 feeds	updated	 in	the	heat	of	 the	moment.	Excepting	whatever	obstacles	may	prevent	 us	 from	 collecting	 such	 testimonials	 and	 analyzing	 them,	 these	messages	 are	 an	exceptional	opportunity	to	recreate	the	hour-by-hour	development	of	participants’	spirits,	perceptions,	and	decisions:	in	other	words,	‘the	emergence	of	a	situational	norm’.148		 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 intensifying	 of	 interpersonal	 connections,	 contradictory	debates	and	discussions	as	well	as	the	‘liberation	of	political	speech’149	echo	the	observations	noted	by	historians	of	the	French	Revolution	when	analyzing	that	revolutionary	mindset.150	In	the	Kasbah	and	on	Tahrir	Square,	just	like	in	the	Palais	Royal	in	1790s	Paris,	individuals	can	become	impromptu	orators,	ranting	at	passers-by,	and	roundtable	discussions	(halaqat	
																																																								145	On	the	nature	and	the	meaning	of	the	barricade,	see	Alain	Corbin,	Jean-Marie	Mayeur	(ed.),	La	Barricade,	Paris,	 Publications	 de	 la	 Sorbonne,	 1997;	Mark	 Traugott,	The	 Insurgent	 Barricade,	 Berkeley,	 University	 of	California	Press,	2010.	For	an	overview,	see	Michel	Offerlé,	‘The	barricade’,	in	David	A.	Snow,	Donatella	Della	Porta,	 Bert	 Klandermans,	 Doug	 McAdam	 (eds),	 The	 Wiley-Blackwell	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Social	 and	 Political	
Movements,	Oxford,	John	Wiley,	forthcoming	2013.	146	Here,	what	J.	Jasper	calls	‘the	power	of	negative	thinking’	is	fully	engaged	(The	Art	of	Moral	Protest,	Chicago,	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1997,	p.	362). 147	O.	Fillieule,	‘The	Independent	Psychological	Effects’,	art.	cit.	148	Ralph	H.	Turner,	Lewis	M.	Killian,	Collective	Behavior,	Englewood	Cliff,	Prentice	Hall,	1957. 149	C.	Kurzman,	The	Unthinkable	Revolution	in	Iran,	op.	cit.	150	M.	Vovelle,	La	mentalité	révolutionnaire,	op.	cit. 
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niqashiyya)	are	improvised	based	on	pre-existing	networks,	to	which	small	groups	may	then	adhere.	 Saturated	with	political	symbols	—	 flags,	 signs,	 graffiti	—	 this	 is	 also	a	 space	 for	singing	 and	 dancing,	 for	 sharing	 food	 and	 having	 fun	 (Y.	 El	 Chazli).151	The	 occupation	 of	popular	 sites	 and	 the	 protests	 that	 rhythm	 their	 daily	 existence	 allow	 demonstrators	 to	‘witness	or	participate	in	the	birth	of	new	practices,	of	new	goals	and	of	a	new	conceptual	framework,	which	reveal	a	more	or	less	radical	transformation	of	habits	and	customs	and	thus	contribute	to	the	creation	of	a	new	identity’.152	Initiation	to	group	know-how	takes	place	in	 a	 few	 different	 ways.	 Organizers	 from	 the	 lower-middle	 class	 may	 transmit	 their	experiences	to	‘novices’;	 likewise,	 ‘upper-middle	class	members	may	choose	to	slum	it,	to	open	up	in	a	whole	new	way	to	urban	youth	culture,	the	latter	teaching	them	how	to	protect	themselves	 and	 how	 to	 procure	 rare	 items’. 153 	These	 observations	 underscore	 the	importance	of	the	spatial	dimension	when	analyzing	social	movements;	as	both	a	resource	and	 one	 of	 the	 elements	 at	 stake, 154 	space	 can	 potentially	 provoke	 sociability	 and	politicization	(see	C.	Hmed	and	A.	Allal).155		
* 
 
*           * 
 	 In	this	essay,	we	have	put	forth	an	approach	which	refutes	all	causality	and	focuses	on	 revolutionary	 situations,	 instead	 of	 searching	 for	 decisive	 factors	 and	 instigating	elements,	or	reflecting	upon	the	consequences	and	outcomes	of	these	situations.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	identifying	contextual	factors	to	understand	the	dynamics	of	emergence	is	
																																																								151	See	 also	 Iman	 Farag,	 ‘En	marge	 de	 la	 révolution	 égyptienne	 :	 écrire	 l’histoire	 ou	 sauver	 la	mémoire	?’,	
Mouvements,	66,	2011,	p.	42–47;	Iman	Mersal,	‘Revolutionary	Humor’,	Globalizations,	8(5),	2011,	p.	669–674;	Lila	Abu-Lughod,	‘Living	the	“Revolution”	in	an	Egyptian	Village.	Moral	Action	in	a	National	Space’,	and	Reem	Saad,	‘The	Egyptian	Revolution.	A	Triumph	of	Poetry’,	American	Ethnologist,	39(1),	2012,	p.	21–25	and	p.	63–66.	152	Annie	Jourdan,	La	Révolution,	une	exception	française	?,	Paris,	Flammarion,	2004,	p.	142.	153	Account	given	by	the	political	scientist	Dina	El-Khawaga	and	collected	by	the	authors. 154	For	example,	Choukri	Hmed,	 ‘Espace	géographique	et	mouvements	sociaux’,	in	O.	Fillieule,	L.	Mathieu,	C.	Péchu	(ed.),	Dictionnaire	des	mouvements	sociaux,	op.	cit.,	p.	220–227.	155	Asef	Bayat,	Street	Politics.	Poor	People’s	Movements	in	Iran,	New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997. 
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superfluous,156	nor	that	considering	the	outcomes	of	revolutionary	situations	is	pointless.157	However,	the	lion’s	share	of	research	has	hitherto	been	focused	on	these	two	aspects,	and	has	thus	neglected	the	study	of	revolutionary	situations	themselves.	The	summary	literature	review	we	have	provided	above	has	confirmed	that	this	is	not	merely	a	view	of	our	mind.		 This	 sea	 change	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	 another,	 equally	 important	 shift	 in	scholarly	research.	Studies	on	revolutionary	situations,	or	more	broadly	on	crisis	situations,	first	and	foremost	attempt	to	examine	and	define	the	resulting	properties	of	these	situations.	Desectorization,	the	creation	of	inter-class	coalitions,	internal	divisions	or	defections	within	the	central	bodies	of	the	state	and	‘calculation	evaporation’	are	all	results	of	the	opening	up	of	a	revolutionary	situation.	We	therefore	propose	examining	the	sequences	of	actions	—	defined	 as	 series	 of	 complex	 but	 observable	 interactions	—which	 lead	 (or	 not)	 to	 these	results.	Two	different	avenues	are	possible	here.	One	may	reconstruct	the	various	steps	of	the	conflict	between	all	the	participants	in	a	given	revolutionary	situation,	in	order	to	isolate	the	most	important	elements	and	outline	their	momentum.	This	is	the	approach	adopted	by	the	papers	we	will	read	further	on.158	On	the	other	hand,	one	may	also	identify	a	series	of	relational	and	cognitive	processes	of	general	scope	operating	within	the	performances	that	lead	to	revolutionary	situations	(this	without	considering	their	success	or	failure).	In	doing	so,	the	modes	of	transformation	from	one	state	to	another	which	are	typical	of	revolutionary	situations	may	be	gleaned.	As	we	have	noted	above,	such	an	objective	is	not	far	from	that	which	 drives	 mechanistic	 approaches.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 differs	 due	 to	 its	 methodological	determinism	 and	 its	 subsequent	 rejection	 of	 causality,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 scales	 of	observation	 used	 and	 its	 focus	 on	 the	micro-foundations	 of	 action.	 Hence	 our	 emphasis	
																																																								156	For	a	critical	analysis	of	the	issue	of	emergence,	and	of	the	combination	of	important	external	and	internal	factors	at	the	same	time	as	micro-events,	see	Stéphane	Cadiou,	Stéphanie	Dechezelles,	‘La	problématique	de	l’émergence	 pour	 l’étude	 des	 mobilisations	 collectives	 :	 pistes	 et	 repères’,	 in	 Stéphane	 Cadiou,	 Stéphanie	Dechezelles,	Antoine	Roger	(ed.),	Passer	à	l’action	:	les	mobilisations	émergentes,	Paris,	L'Harmattan,	2007,	p.	11–48.	157	Studies	on	the	outcomes	of	protest	movements	are	indeed	fascinating,	whether	they	are	conducted	at	the	level	of	heavy	macro-level	social	variables	(for	example,	cultural	changes),	the	orientation	of	public	policy,	or	even	the	biographical	consequences	of	involvement.	For	a	review	of	the	existing	literature	on	this	subject,	see,	Didier	Chabanet,	Marco	Giugni,	‘Les	conséquences	des	mouvement	sociaux’,	in	O.	Fillieule,	É.	Agrikoliansky,	I.	Sommier	(ed.),	Penser	les	mouvements	sociaux,	op.	cit.,	p.	145–162.	158	This	is	also	the	approach	adopted	by	the	authors	of	a	forthcoming	volume	which,	like	this	text,	will	collect	various	 works	 stemming	 from	 eyewitness	 observations	 on	 the	 ground:	 Amin	 Allal,	 Thomas	 Pierret	 (ed.),	
Devenir	révolutionnaires.	Au	cœur	des	révoltes	arabes,	Paris,	Armand	Colin,	forthcoming	2013.	
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above	on	actors	and	their	decision-making	processes	in	situ,	as	well	as	conflicts	and	their	potential	 saliency.	 The	 following	 chart	 shows	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 aforementioned	elements,	divided	into	two	categories.		 First	 of	 all,	 we	 choose	 to	 distinguish	 between	 conducive	 elements,	 processes	 and	revolutionary	 situations.	 This	 diachronic	 distinction	 between	 three	 different	 classes	 of	elements	 is	 naturally	 porous	 and	 requires	 a	 case-by-case	 evaluation.	 Firstly,	 because	 the	processes	that	lead	to	revolutionary	situations	can	continue	to	operate	therein	as	the	latter	develop;	 and	 secondly,	 because	 the	 distinction	 between	 starting	 conditions	 and	 the	components	of	change	between	states	are	difficult	to	pin	down.	This	is	a	classic	problem	for	neuroscientists	and	biologists,	both	of	whom	ultimately	make	decisions	based	on	pragmatic	considerations.159		 To	 stick	 to	 an	 example,	 what	 is	 important	 here	 is	 to	 separate,	 at	 the	environmental	level,	the	more	or	less	exclusive	and	interventionist	character	of	the	state160	or	the	predominant	forms	of	social	segmentation161.	Those	elements	contribute	to	frame,	at	the	micro	and	meso	levels,	the	incidence,	the	form	and	scope	of	processes	of	emulation	and	attribution	 of	 similarity.	 Hence	 generating,	 among	 other	 results,	 modularity,	 or	 the	heightened	transferability	of	modes	of	action	and	recognizable	frameworks	across	space	and	time,	or	the	spread	of	protests	to	a	significant	portion	of	the	population.	Secondly,	a	similarly	difficult	 distinction	 must	 also	 be	 made	 between	 the	 three	 scales	 of	 analysis	 used.	 For	example,	the	process	of	the	attribution	of	similarity	(the	strategic	identification	of	potential	imitators	 with	 original	 instigators)	 observable	 at	 the	 relational	 level	 is	 linked,	 at	 the	cognitive	level,	to	emulation	(i.e.,	hope	for	success).	However,	this	distinction	seems	useful	for	the	purpose	of	isolating	different	levels	of	observation	of	these	processes,	some	of	which	cannot	be	easily	reduced	to	cognitive	processes	(e.g.,	brokerage).162		 	
																																																								159	Carl	F.	Craver,	‘Mechanisms	and	Natural	Kinds’,	Philosophical	Psychology,	22(5),	2009,	p.	575–594.	160	M.	Parsa,	States,	Ideologies,	op.	cit. 161	Anthony	Oberschall,	Social	Conflict	and	Social	Movements,	Englewood	Cliffs,	Prentice	Hall,	1973.	162	Tulia	G.	Falleti,	Julia	Lynch,	‘From	Process	to	Mechanism.	Varieties	of	Disaggregation’,	Qualitative	Sociology,	31(3),	2008,	p.	333–339.	
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Some	Modes	of	Transformation	of	States	Specific	to	Revolutionary	Situations		
Conducive	Elements	(present	outside	of	the	crisis’	temporal	framework)	 Processes	(how	conflict	develops	step-by-step	between	individual	and	collective	actors)	
Revolutionary	
Situation	(dual-power	situation)	 Scale	of	the	Analysis		
Structural	Form	of	the	State	(+/-	interventionist,	exclusive)	Form	of	the	class	conflict	(+/-	polarized)	Vertical/horizontal	segmentation	Type	of	international	support	for	the	regime	De-differentiation	
Short-term	Change	in	support	to	the	regime	Military	defeat	Coup	d’état,	‘palace	coup’	Neighboring	revolutionary	situation,	etc.	
	 Spread	of	protests	to	a	significant	portion	of	the	population	Blurring	of	boundaries	between	social	spaces	Large	inter-class	coalitions	Modularity	of	modes	of	action	and	framing	
Macro	(environmental)	
Collective	actors’	level	of	resources	(organizational,	leadership,	ideological,	etc.)	Brokerage	ability	Collective	memory	of	past	struggles		
Attribution	of	similarity	Construction	of	strategic	identities	Cooptation	Concessions	Divisions	Targeted/discriminatory	repression	
Division/defections	within	the	state	or	repressive	apparatus	Frame	simplification	and	unification	of	modes	of	action	
Meso	(relational)	
Individual	memory	of	past	struggles	Socialization/politicization	Social	status	Growing	confusion	and	uncertainty	with	regard	to	expectations	
Shift	in	the	balance	between	public	and	private	preferences	Emulation	(evaluation	of	one’s	chances	for	success)	Assurance/de-assurance	games	Bandwagon	effect	and	counter-effect	Critical	mass/free	rider	
Calculation	evaporation	 Micro	(cognitive)	
	 																																				T1...T2...T3...T4...T5...etc.																																																												Tx			 	
Sequences	of	action	that	can	lead	to	the	instauration	of	a	revolutionary	situation	
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	 The	list	of	elements	above	is	tentative	and	non-definitive;	it	should	be	completed	by	further	 research.	 In	 addition,	 the	 distinction	 between	 events	 and	 processes	 should	 be	refined.	If	processes	are	defined	as	the	succession	of	moves	made	by	individual	and	collective	actors,	then	they	are	composed	of,	but	not	reducible	to,	events.	In	its	current	state,	the	chart	above	does	not	specify	what	we	mean	by	repression	as	a	process	(that	is,	a	strategy	employed	with	a	specific	aim	and	which	 is	based	on	predicting	the	moves	of	adversaries	as	well	as	allies)	and	repressive	events	as	moves	made	at	a	given	time.		 Finally,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 processes	 develop	 in	 different	 ways	 depending	 on	 their	preliminary	 conditions;	 it	 is	 likewise	 possible	 that	 they	 are	 not	 all	 equally	 central	 to	 the	emergence	of	a	revolutionary	situation.	Most	importantly,	however,	processes	acquire	their	power	 by	 combining	with	 each	 other	 both	 synchronically	 and	diachronically	—	with	 the	result	 that	 a	process,	by	 itself,	explains	 nothing.	 As	we	 know,	 the	 authors	of	Dynamics	 of	
Contention	 faced	criticism	for	 inconsistently	shifting	between	the	production	of	historical	narratives	and	the	identification	of	mechanisms	as	explanatory	variables.163	We	believe	that	studying	 sequences	 of	 actions	 and	 thus	 the	 combination	 of	 processes	 activated	 and	experienced	 by	 the	 involved	 parties	 will	 allow	 us	 to	 unravel	 the	 successive	 stages	 that	potentially	 lead,	 here	 and	 there,	 to	 revolutionary	 situations.	 In	 this	 fashion,	 we	 avoid	establishing	both	the	laws	governing	the	development	of	revolutionary	situations	and	the	unique	and	circumstantial	narrative	of	any	particular	revolutionary	trajectory.		 For	example,	at	the	beginning	of	2011	similar	processes	were	at	work	in	both	Egypt	and	Morocco.	And	yet,	these	processes	did	not	produce	similar	results:	in	the	former	case,	they	 led	 to	 a	 revolutionary	 situation,	 while	 in	 the	 latter	 they	 opened	 up	 ‘reformist’	possibilities.	Both	countries	witnessed	the	attribution	of	similarity	and	the	construction	of	strategic	identities,	which	translated	into	the	creation	of	coalitions	transcending	pre-existing	cleavages	 and	 polarizations.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 modalities	 of	 crisis	 management	combined	 differently.	 In	 Egypt’s	 case,	 concessions	 came	 too	 late	 following	 lengthy	 and	indiscriminate	 repression.	 In	 Morocco,	 however,	 the	 rapid	 proposals	 for	 reform,																																																									163	Pamela	Oliver	describes	this	tension	well	when	she	remarks	that	‘a	generalizing	strategy	focused	on	one	process	 can	 never	explain	 a	 historical	 episode,	 and	 should	 not	 try	 to.	 But	 conversely,	 a	 research	 program	focused	 on	 explaining	 particular	 historical	 events	 cannot	 yield	 a	 general	 understanding	 of	 any	 process’	(‘Mechanisms	of	Contention’,	Mobilization,	8(1),	2003,	p.	119–122,	here	p.	121).	See	also	Ruud	Koopmans,	‘A	Failed	Revolution	–	but	a	Worthy	Cause’,	Mobilization,	8(1),	2003,	p.	116–119,	here	p.	117.	
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redistribution	 capacity	 building	—	 in	 part	 thanks	 to	 international	 aid	—	 and	 the	 use	 of	selective	and	timely	repression	combined	to	result	in	the	implementation	by	protestors	of	organizational	tools	allowing	them	to	‘control	the	streets’	and	prevent	the	kind	of	‘spillage’	which	 in	 Egypt	 led	 to	 instigators	 being	 overrun	 by	 their	 followers.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	Morocco,	 the	 protestors’	 self-limitation	 helped	 to	 prolong	 the	mobilization’s	momentum;	unlike	in	Egypt,	the	point	of	no	return	was	never	reached,	and	thus	a	gradual	path	towards	change	remained	possible.		 In	conclusion,	we	would	 like	to	briefly	return	to	the	question	of	how	best	 to	study	sequences	of	action.	We	believe	that	it	is	necessary	to	systematically	connect	the	description	of	phenomena	with	the	meaning	that	actors	attribute	to	the	actions	they	take,	when	they	take	them.	 This	 is	 the	 only	 manner	 in	 which	 researchers	 can	 avoid	 imputing	 motivations	 to	individuals	based	solely	on	 the	observation	of	 their	 acts.	As	R.	Aya	sarcastically	remarks,	without	meaning	 that	 actors	 attribute	 to	 the	 different	 steps	 of	 a	 process,	 the	 analysis	 of	situations	cannot	be	rooted	in	evidence	or	facts	but	‘gratuitous	assumption	—	usually	some	sociological	 cliché’. 164 	The	 issue	 is	 thus	 how	 to	 record	 explanatory	 clues:	 that	 is,	‘circumstantial	evidence	for	hope	of	success’.165	We	believe	that	the	authors	contained	in	this	volume	have	contributed	several	answers	and	opened	up	at	least	two	different	avenues	for	future	research.		 First	 of	 all,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 imputing	 wild	 meanings	 and	 making	 homogenous	classifications,	as	well	as	the	groundless	guesses	of	pragmatic	sociology,	we	must	attempt	to	elaborate	a	precise	sociography	of	participants	in	all	their	diversity,	by	putting	their	actions	and	 perceptions	 back	 into	 a	 personal	 and	 familial	 historical	 perspective.	 This	 involves	focusing	on	the	main	principles	of	political	socialization	and	connecting	the	investigation	on	personal	dispositions	towards	acting	with	the	way	in	which	activist	experiences	and	events	transform	individuals.166	In	other	words,	according	to	a	perspective	that	is	neither	‘causal’	
																																																								164	R.	Aya,	 ‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	 cit.	 J.	Bohstedt	directs	 this	 same	criticism	at	E.	P.	Thompson	regarding	 the	concept	of	‘moral	economy’	which	he	deems	to	be	a	romantic	notion,	even	though	greater	attention	paid	to	the	riots	would	have	allowed	him	to	better	understand	the	role	of	morality	and	decorum	at	the	heart	of	actors’	calculations	—	both	rioters	and	representatives	of	law	and	order	(John	Bohstedt,	‘The	Moral	Economy	and	the	Discipline	of	Historical	Context’,	Journal	of	Social	History,	26(2),	Winter	1992,	p.	265–284).	165	R.	Aya,	‘The	Third	Man’,	art.	cit.,	p.	151. 166	Olivier	 Fillieule,	 ‘Socialization	and	 Social	Movements’,	 in	D.	 A.	 Snow,	D.	Della	Porta,	B.	 Klandermans,	D.	McAdam	(eds),	The	Wiley-Blackwell	Encyclopedia	of	Social	and	Political	Movements	Oxford,	op.	cit.	
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nor	 ‘linear’,	 one	 should	 measure	 how	 ‘commitment	 generates	 or	 modifies	 dispositions	towards	 acting,	 thinking	 and	 perceiving	—	 including	 self-perception	—	 in	 continuity	 or	breaking	with	the	previous	products	of	socialization’.167	To	do	this,	longitudinal	studies	are	necessary.	We	will	of	course	have	to	wait	several	years	before	being	able	to	answer	these	questions,	but	if	we	hope	to	address	them	by	means	of	longitudinal	rather	than	retrospective	studies,	we	must	begin	today.		 Secondly,	 having	 recourse	 to	 the	 sociology	 of	 revolutionary	 situations	 requires	instruments	and	methods	of	observation	that	allow	for	the	study	of	sequences	of	action	in	the	whole	of	their	eventfulness.	From	this	perspective,	the	visual	materials	accessible	on	the	Internet168,	either	produced	by	researchers	or	collected	in	situ,	are	precious,169	in	particular	in	situations	where	artistic	production	(caricatures,	graffiti,	photography,	videos)	played	an	important	 role	 in	 the	 protests.170	But	most	 of	 all,	 as	 scholars	 have	 increasingly	 realized,	ethnographic	methods171	are	without	a	doubt	the	best	suited	to	reconstruct	the	complexity																																																									167	Catherine	Leclercq,	Julie	Pagis,	‘Les	incidences	biographiques	de	l’engagement’,	Sociétés	contemporaines,	84,	2011,	p.	5–23,	here	p.	5.	168	A	 plethora	 of	 resources	 are	available	 online.	 Social	 networks	 link	 to	 a	wealth	 of	 images	and	 videos	 on	YouTube,	while	collective	national	blogs	disseminate	tracts,	calls	to	action,	photos,	videos,	graffiti	(for	example,	<https://www.facebook.com/GraffitiEgypt/photos>),	 caricatures,	 interactive	maps	 of	 protest	 sites,	 opinion	pieces	(for	example,	Nawaat.org	created	in	Tunisia	in	2004	and	Mamfakkinch.com	launched	in	Morocco	on	February	17th,	2011,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	February	20	Movement).	 In	 turn,	bloggers’	networks	such	as	Global	Voices,	 a	 foundation	 created	 in	 2004,	 select,	 translate	 and	 publish	 articles	 in	 25	 different	 languages.	 The	number	 of	 political	 analysis	 blog	 aggregators	 is	 growing	 (for	 example,	 <http://www.arabist.net/>).	 The	international	media	has	also	chosen	to	put	documentaries	online.	Very	rapidly,	individual	or	group	initiatives	for	archiving	were	taken,	both	activist	and	academic	(for	example,	<http://www.tahrirdocuments.org/>).	An	open	 letter	 was	 even	 posted	 on	 Facebook	 asking	 for	 the	 network	 to	 open	 up	 part	 of	 its	 archives	(<http://europe-liberte-securite-justice.org/2011/01/27/lettre-ouverte-a-facebook-sidibouzid/>).	 With	regard	to	Tunisian	events,	the	Bibliothèque	nationale	de	France	and	the	Bibliothèque	du	Congrès	collaborated	with	 the	 American	 non-profit	 Internet	 Archive	 to	 archive	 traditional	 media	 sites,	 information	 portals,	journalists’	 and	 individuals’	 blogs,	 activists’	 Facebook	 pages,	 etc.	 In	 terms	 of	 Egypt,	 these	 same	 partners	collaborated	with	Stanford	University,	the	American	University	in	Cairo,	the	British	Library	and	the	Alexandria	Library.	Moreover,	as	early	as	March	28th,	2011,	the	Committee	for	Documenting	the	Revolution	was	founded	by	the	Egyptian	National	Library	and	Archives:		<http://www.aucegypt.edu/newsatauc/Pages/story.aspx?eid=640;http://blog.bnf.fr/lecteurs/	index.php/2012/07/02/la-revolution-du-jasmin-sur-la-toile/;http://www.archive-it.org/public/collection.html?id=2323>).	169	Alexandre	Lambelet,	‘Analyser	les	rassemblements	au	moyen	de	photographies	ou	de	films.	Pistes	et	enjeux’,	ethnographiques.org,	 21,	 2010,	 <http://www.ethnographiques.org/2010/Lambelet>;	 Alex	 Philipps,	 ‘Visual	Protest	Material	as	Empirical	Data’,	Visual	Communication,	11(3),	2012,	p.	3–21.	170	Among	others,	see	Anahi	Alviso-Marino,	‘Art	et	révolution	:	engagement	des	artistes	dans	la	mobilisation	contestataire	au	Yémen’,	forthcoming;	Cécile	Boëx,	‘L’engagement	des	acteurs,	des	cinéastes	et	des	comédiens	dans	la	révolte	en	Syrie’,	in	A.	Allal,	T.	Pierret	(ed.),	Devenir	révolutionnaires,	op.	cit.	171	For	example,	Suzanne	Staggenborg,	 ‘Seeing	Mechanisms	 in	Action’,	Qualitative	Sociology,	31(4),	2008,	p.	341–344;	O.	Fillieule,	É.	Agrikoliansky,	I.	Sommier	(ed.),	Penser	les	mouvements	sociaux,	op.	cit.;	Hélène	Combes	
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of	 conflicts	 and	 calculations	 at	 every	 step	 of	 a	 sequence	 of	 action.	 And	 yet,	 the	 existing	literature	 on	 the	 sociology	 of	 revolutions,	 and	 more	 generally	 on	 the	 sociology	 of	mobilizations,	is	particularly	silent	in	this	department.	It	is	unfortunate	that	the	possibilities	for	research	opened	up	by	authors	as	diverse	as	D.	Snow	and	L.	Anderson,	B.	Roy,	A.	Peterson	and	of	course	P.	Lichterman	and	J.	Auyero172	have	not	prompted	a	widespread	move	towards	an	ethnographic	approach	to	the	sociology	of	social	movements	and	revolutions,	barring	a	few	rare	but	notable	exceptions.173			 Finally,	 when	 faced	 with	 such	 an	 overabundance	 of	 sources,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	dissecting	the	sequences	of	action	that	lead	to	revolutionary	situations	is	beyond	the	capacity	of	a	sole	researcher:	this	objective	instead	requires	the	creation	of	multidisciplinary	research	teams,	endowed	with	linguistic	and	IT	skills,174	but	also	with	a	deep	understanding	of	the	historical	 nature	 of	 the	 areas	 studied.	 We	 hope	 that	 the	 essays	 which	 follow	 will	 fully	demonstrate	 this	 need.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 we	 must	 stress	 that	 focusing	 our	observations	on	revolutionary	situations	does	not	mean	neglecting	an	understanding	of	the	socio-history	of	practices	and	the	sociology	of	activist	careers.		 When	asked	for	his	opinion	on	the	French	Revolution	in	1789,	Zhou	Enlai	is	said	to	have	cleverly	responded	that	it	was	too	soon	to	tell.	As	we	conclude	this	introduction	to	the	current	and	on-going	Arab	uprisings	with	this	wise	anecdote,	we	must	 therefore	concede	that	we	are	only	now	in	the	first	stages	of	this	journey.175																																																									et	al.,	‘Observer	les	mobilisations’,	Politix,	93,	2011,	p.	7–27.	172	David	A.	Snow,	Leon	Anderson,	Down	on	Their	Luck.	A	Study	of	Homeless	Street	People,	Berkeley,	University	of	California	Press,	1993,	on	protests	regarding	the	issue	of	Austin’s	homeless	population;	Paul	Lichterman,	The	
Search	for	Political	Community.	American	Activists	Reinventing	Commitment,	New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996,	on	community	activism	in	California;	Anna	L.	Peterson,	Martyrdom	and	the	Politics	of	Religion.	
Progressive	 Catholicism	 in	 El	 Salvador's	 Civil	 War,	 Albany,	 SUNY	 Press,	 1997,	 on	 progressive	 Catholic	movements	in	El	Salvador;	Javier	Auyero,	Contentious	Lives.	Two	Argentine	Women,	Two	Protests,	and	the	Quest	
for	Recognition,	Durham,	Duke	University	Press,	2003,	on	the	politicization	processes	of	two	Argentine	women.	173	In	 particular,	 Elisabeth	 Jean	Wood,	 Insurgent	 Collective	 Action	 and	 Civil	War	 in	 El	 Salvador,	 New	 York,	Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2003;	 Ann	 Mische,	 Partisan	 Publics.	 Communication	 and	 Contention	 Across	
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